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ABSTRACT 
This project builds upon the NPS Advanced Digital Advisor 
Partnering Technologies (ADAPT) project, formerly known as the Remote Advise 
and Assist (RAA) kit. The RAA kit was developed to fill the policy gap that 
prohibited U.S. forces from accompanying partner forces. ADAPT expands the RAA 
technology beyond the Direct-Action mission set to all potential mission types. The 
NPS research team proposes the development of JOCTAK, a unified TAK solution 
that can aggregate and display critical relevant information from the network of users 
and sensors. Much like ATAK, JOCTAK has the potential to display mission-
specific and sensor information at the individual operator level, but also to 
aggregate and instantaneously analyze data and information from multiple units and 
sensors across the operational area. The capability to do so provides an operational level 
COP that facilitates timely decision making by both the commander, staffs, and 
tactical elements. In addition to aggregating the numerous flows of information into 
a single comprehensive system, it repurposes the Remote Advise Assist concept to 
CWMD operations. An integrated TAK system would allow nuclear and CWMD 
subject matter experts who are not organic to the DOD, or not physically located in 
the JOC, to remotely advise and assist U.S. and partner forces in response to a 
CWMD operation. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The escalation of concerns surrounding a nuclear armed North Korea has 
illuminated the operational scope and size that a military response to a nuclear crisis on the 
Korean Peninsula would require. Such a massive undertaking would  necessitate the 
involvment of multiple disparate U.S. Special Operations Forces (USSOF) and 
multinational special operations forces (SOF) partners with various chemical, biological, 
radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) sensor technologies, all of which operate independently 
with seperate command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence (C4I) 
systems. At present, there are no unified joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and 
multinational (JIIM) C4I solutions capable of responding to a countering weapons of mass 
destruction (CWMD) crisis on the Korean Peninsula. Current Department of Defense 
(DOD) and U.S. government C4I systems, networks, and CBRN equipment have limited 
interconnectivity within the U.S. government and with JIIM partners. To address this gap, 
a C4I system would have to include numerous situational awareness (SA) and command 
and control (C2) capabilities that also facilitate the free exchange of critical information 
and CBRN data among JIIM partners.  
The crux of all multinational operations, particularly addressing the Democratic 
People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) nuclear problem set, is the requirement for an 
unprecedented level of multinational coordination and information sharing. These threats 
create the necessity for collaboration among international partners and U.S. JIIM partners. 
A military CWMD operation on the Korean Peninsula would create specific, nuanced 
technological challenges that must be overcome. Existing military doctrine outlines the 
requirement for effective C2 systems and discusses the challenges presented by 
multinational operations. Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 6–0, Mission Command, 
describes the need for mission command systems to facilitate the development of a 
common operational picture that enables collaboration and timely decision-making.1 This 
1 Department of The Army, Mission Command, ADP 6–0 (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 
2014), iv. 
2 
requirement for multiple stakeholder involvement becomes more apparent in the context 
of recent research that identifies 143 U.S. government organizations responsible for 
counter proliferation alone.2 In “Preparing for a Crisis,” John Lyford identifies a complex 
network of stakeholders both in the United States and internationally that would be 
involved in a DPRK CWMD scenario. The number of stakeholders speaks to the need for 
a solution that encompasses both technical and non-technical JIIM collaboration 
requirements to facilitate the required joint solutions.3 
The inability to share information rapidly across domains and among JIIM partners 
often hampers effectiveness, and it is a critical requirement for a timely and effective 
CWMD response.4 The requirement for specialized nuclear and radiological sensors 
specific for SOF CWMD operations depends not only upon operator-level expertise but 
also upon near real-time analysis. While there are U.S. units specially trained for CBRN 
and CWMD response, military action in a potential North Korean scenario would require 
a greater number of SOF and CBRN forces than are currently available.5 Similar to the use 
of the Android tactical assault kit (ATAK) used as an advising platform in Syria and Iraq, 
the ATAK could facilitate the advising of undertrained forces, or enable conventional 
forces to participate in the CWMD/CBRN missions on the Korean peninsula. Additionally, 
fielded CBRN equipment must be able to transmit data, and digitally reach back to 
headquarters for near-instantaneous analysis and decision making. Existing solutions 
specific to either mission command or CWMD/CBRN operations are insufficient and the 
current, dated and proprietary technology available to the United States, or a given systems 
developer, lacks cross-platform communication through a standard language or file format, 
forcing ad hoc and limited C4I solutions. 
2 Erik J. Stanfield, “Lost in Translation: Lessons from Counterterrorism for a More Proactive Weapons 
of Mass Destruction Strategy” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2017), 12–13. 
https://calhoun.nps.edu/handle/10945/55539. 
3 John Lyford et al., “Preparing for a Crisis: Network Coordination to Deal with North Korea’s WMD” 
(master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2017), 2. 
4 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Multinational Operations, JP 3–16 (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, July 
16, 2013), I6. 
5 Lyford et al., “Preparing for a Crisis,” 2. 
3 
In a 2016 interview, LTG(R) Tovo, former United States Army Special Operation 
Command (USASOC) Commander, stated: 
We need a better means to aggregate our data streams and improve the speed 
and ease with which we synthesize information at the tactical and 
operational levels. We need a software tool, likely web-based, that 
aggregates existing feeds into a single interactive interface through which 
commanders and staffs can plan and execute operations. We also need 
small, secure, and mobile wireless systems that are capable of accessing and 
aggregating data stream anywhere a network is available. This includes 
handheld systems that connect to a networked common operating and 
intelligence picture and other situational awareness tools. The handheld 
systems must support ARSOF personnel operating in small, highly 
dispersed teams within an austere environment, to include denied territory.6 
A viable solution to this gap exists in the form of currently used SOF technology, 
especially the Tactical Assault Kit (TAK). At the tactical level, the Android variant of the 
TAK (ATAK) has proven its ability to provide situational awareness and interoperability 
among U.S. and partner nation SOF. Our research, spurred by the intesifying nuclear threat 
the DPRK has posed, has identified gaps within current SOF C4I systems. This research 
has identified the opportunity to solidify the currently fielded ATAK within tactical-level 
formations as an SA and command and control (C2) tool for traditional and CBRN 
operations and scale it for use as a special operations C4I and mission command system. 
The Tactical Assault Kit (TAK) demonstrate the ability to aggregate and display 
information and the ATAK’s prolific use in SOF operations at the tactical level makes it a 
logical solution to address this capability gap. The TAK network is adaptable by design, 
and the system can be expanded from a tactical-level tool to a unified Special Operations 
Joint Task Force (SOJTF) situational awareness (SA) and mission command system. 
By its very nature, the TAK possesses the sort of interoperability and flexibility that 
will allow it to be easily adapted for use in this capability gap. Our research continued the 
development of a Joint Operations Center Tactical Assault Kit (JOCTAK), a unified TAK 
solution that can aggregate and display critical and relevant information from the network 
                                                 
6 Jeff McKaughan, “Q&A with Lieutenant General Tovo,” Special Operations International, October 
2016, 7–9, https://issuu.com/jeffmckaughan/docs/specops_14-7_final. 
4 
of users and sensors. Much like the ATAK, the JOCTAK could display mission-specific 
and sensor information at the individual operator level but also aggregate and 
instantaneously analyze data and information from multiple units and sensors across the 
operational area. This capability could provide a level of understanding that facilitates 
timely decision-making by commanders, staff, and tactical elements. In addition, to 
aggregating numerous flows of information into a single, comprehensive system. The 
inherent technical aspects of CWMD and CBRN operations require the use of specialized 
sensors and expertise that may reside outside of a tactical military headquarters. An 
integrated TAK system would allow CBRN subject matter experts (SME) not organic to 
the DOD or physically located in the joint operations center to remotely advise and assist 
U.S. and partner forces in real-time during a CWMD operation. 
A. CAPSTONE PURPOSE 
The purpose of this project is to identify, research, and analyze C2/C4I 
inefficiencies of SOF operations in a JIIM CWMD environment and to identify possible 
improvements of interoperability by streamlining and simplifying digital collaboration 
tools. We continued research and proof of concept experimentation for the development of 
the Joint Operations Center for the Tactical Assault Kit (JOCTAK), a unified TAK solution 
that could aggregate and display critical relevant information from a vast network of users 
and sensors. At the time we began our research, the Combating Terrorism Technical 
Support Office (CTTSO) had accepted the JOCTAK concept as a capability requirement, 
and the process for determining its required capabilities had begun.7 The JOCTAK has the 
potential to display mission-specific and sensor information from the individual operator 
level, as well as aggregate and instantaneously analyze data and information from multiple 
units and sensors across the operational area. The capability to do so would provide an 
operational-level common operating picture (COP) that facilitates timely decision-making 
by the commander, staffs, and tactical elements. In addition to aggregating the numerous 
flows of information into a single comprehensive system, the inherent technical aspects of 
CWMD and CBRN operations requires the use of specialized sensors and expertise that 
                                                 
7 Bryan Taylor, personal communication, 24 April 2018. 
5 
may reside outside of the headquarters (HQ). An integrated TAK system would allow 
nuclear and CWMD SMEs that are not organic to the DOD or physically located in the 
joint operations center (JOC) to remotely advise and assist U.S. and partner forces in real 
time, during a CWMD operation (Figure 1). 
 
Figure 1. CWMD JOCTAK construct 
Given the inherent JIIM nature of CWMD and SOF operations, we identify gaps in 
two main areas that warrant further research and what we believe would make the most 
significant impact on operations. First, integrate CBRN sensor capability into existing 
tactical level C4I technology. Second, develop a comprehensive operational level C4I 
solution that is dynamic enough to meet the needs of SOF, JIIM, and CWMD operations. 
Although multiple CBRN software solutions currently exist, the ATAK’s 
demonstrated effectiveness and capabilities as an SA and tactical-level C2 tool during 
combat operations have made it the SOF technical solution of choice. The ATAK’s status 
as a program of record within Special Operations Command (SOCOM) and managed by 
Special Operations Mission Planning Environment will only further promulgate its usage. 
Therefore, the integration of CBRN-sensor technology into the ATAK warrants further 
6 
research with the goal of minimizing the technological burden of warfighters and 
consolidating sensor data into a single technological solution. This would provide the most 
comprehensive understanding of the operational environment and apply to all aspects of 
the mission. 
The same multiplicity and duplication of CBRN systems applies to mission 
command systems. The JIIM component of CWMD operations demands a software 
solution flexible enough to adapt and support all missions. Commanders must be able to 
make timely decisions facilitated by accurate information and input from all relevant 
stakeholders. If scaled correctly, this collaboration could be enabled through the versatility 
of the TAK infrastructure. Therefore, the second thrust of our effort is to research and 
analyze the effectiveness of the TAK infrastructure as an operational level C4I solution. 
We looked to develop ideas that could enable the seamless transfer of information, 
collaboration, and interoperability between SOF elements, a joint task force (JTF) HQ, and 
JIIM stakeholders unrestricted by geography or distance.  
Furthermore, the scaled integration of the TAK technologies into SOF CWMD 
operations allows the continued expansion of the ATAKs use beyond familiar and proven 
applications. The previous utilization of the ATAK as a Remote Advise and Assist (RAA) 
tool between Special Forces detachments and Iraqi SOF partners can now be reimagined 
to a U.S.-based SME advising a Special Forces detachment that is on a mission outside of 
the continental United States. The technical requirements of CBRN operations could 
quickly escalate beyond the knowledge depth within the tactical unit or headquarters. For 
example, analysis of a specific CBRN sensor reading, or the discovery of an unknown 
device or substance, could be routed directly from a SME to the Special Forces detachment 
through the TAK software.  
B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
1. How can the expansion of the TAK concept to the joint operational level 
in the form of a JOCTAK improve the collective planning, mission 
command, and digital collaboration between JIIM partners during a 
CWMD operation? 
7 
2. How can the TAK-compatible CBRN sensors, and CBRN plug-ins, 
improve the RAA capability among operators, technical specialists, and 
mission command during a CWMD scenario? 
3. What are the necessary CWMD sensor components and TAK plug-in 
software designs for meeting future JIIM mission sets? 
C. OBJECTIVES 
The objective of this research is to test a proof of concept by demonstrating the 
feasibility of expanding the TAK network to act as an operational-level C4I mission 
command system for CWMD operations and provide feedback to the development of a 
JOCTAK by focusing on the following: 
1. Demonstrate, as a proof of concept, the feasibility of expanding the ATAK 
from a tactical-level capability to an operational-level C4I mission 
command system for CWMD operations.  
2. Envision how USSOF would work with partners in a CWMD scenario, 
connecting them through a federated TAK infrastructure. 




This research followed a ground-up approach to improve the effectiveness of SOF 
units conducting CWMD operations through testing of tactical-level CWMD sensor 
technology and its integration into the TAK infrastructure. The usefulness of tactical level 
units in a CWMD environment is predicated on their ability to detect, locate, and efficiently 
identify radiological material.8 Coordinating the sensory information in near real-time 
from multiple tactical level units/sensors is required for efficient large-scale CWMD 
mission sets as well as the ability to perform RAA to tactical elements from CWMD SMEs 
in a timely manner. Once incorporated into the TAK, these technologies provide the 
groundwork for use as a comprehensive operational-level JOC technology suite providing 
the SA tools necessary for JIIM operations against weapons of mass destruction (WMD) 
threats. 
E. ORGANIZATION OF THESIS 
Chapter II reviews significant background information, guiding doctrine, and 
familiarization with the TAK and its previous use. Chapter III discusses the application of 
the TAK system applied as a CWMD C4I system and includes a series of vignettes that 
illustrate the added value to both the tactical level warfighter and the operational level 
command. Chapter IV details the iterative experimentation process we performed to 
identify capability gaps in the ATAK system to determine what needs to be done to develop 
and expand use of the TAK to the joint operations center. Chapter IV also contains our 
recommendations for the development of the JOCTAK. Chapter V is our conclusion and 
discusses findings regarding our research questions in the context of the overall framework 
of CWMD JIIM C4I solutions. 
 
                                                 
8 Alex Bordestsky, personal communication, May 2018. 
9 
II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
In August 2016, a presidential memorandum transferred the DOD CWMD 
“integrating and synchronizing” efforts from U.S. Strategic Command to the U.S. Special 
Operations Command.9 Today, joint warfighting concepts are still transitioning from 
traditional to nontraditional threats. This change in focus addresses current and future 
operational environments. The traditional threat, the Cold War peer-to-peer battlefield 
scenario, focused primarily on the air-land battle concept and combined arms maneuver 
warfare. The new, nontraditional environment is characterized by threats from multiple 
domains, including the evolution of traditional weaponry and the emergence of cyber 
threats. Additionally, the new environment needs to account for growing nontraditional 
threats from non-state actors as well as smaller belligerent nation-states such as Iran and, 
most recently, North Korea.  
Threats posed by North Korea, China, and Russia are at levels not experienced since 
the height of the arms race between world superpowers during the Cold War.10 
Fortunately, the gravity of these threats is understood and efforts to quell them persist. The 
2017 National Security Strategy identified the threat and defense against nuclear, chemical, 
radiological, and biological WMD as a top priority. “Building on decades of initiatives, we 
will augment measures to secure, eliminate, and prevent the spread of WMD and related 
materials, their delivery systems, technologies, and knowledge to reduce the chance that 
                                                 
9 President Obama’s amendment of the Defense Secretary’s 2005 directive designating U.S. Strategic 
Command the lead command for “integrating and synchronizing DoD in combating WMD,” which 
changed the lead command to U.S. Special Operations Command. Donald H. Rumsfeld, “Designation of 
Responsibilities for Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction to Commander, U.S. Strategic Command” 
(Washington, DC: Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2005); Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, DoD 
Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction, DoD Policy Directive 2060.02 (Washington, DC: Under 
Secretary of Defense for Policy), 10.  
10 William J. Perry, “Twitter Post,” January 3, 2018, https://twitter.com/secdef19/status/
948774922884562944?lang=en. 
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they might fall into the hands of hostile actors. We will hold state and non-state actors 
accountable for the use of WMD.”11 
Recent actions by state actors challenge international norms of nuclear and other 
types of WMD proliferation and aggression. For example, for more than two decades North 
Korea has continued its pursuit of nuclear weapons despite promises to the contrary. 
According to a March 2018 Foreign Policy Report, “Pyongyang’s nuclear weapons and 
missile programs are far more advanced than at any previous time.”12 While discussing 
recent developments of the North Korean regime’s nuclear program, United Nations 
Secretary-General António Guterres explained that they have “broken the global norm 
against nuclear test explosions” calling it “profoundly destabilizing for regional and 
international security.”13 While recent U.S. diplomacy efforts appear to have silenced 
ongoing progress, recent reports indicate the North Korean regime is likely to continue its 
efforts despite sanctions and the U.S. North Korean summit.14 
Terrorist organizations and illicit actors also represent a significant WMD threat to 
the United States. In addition to the United States, eight other countries possess nuclear 
weapons, and as many as 12 maintain stockpiles of chemical and biological weapons and 
possible delivery systems.15 The interconnectivity of today’s world means that non-
conforming countries with nuclear programs represent threats not only from their regimes 
but also risk proliferation of the world’s most destructive weapons to transnational terrorist 
organizations around the globe.16 Terrorist organizations and hostile governments’ 
                                                 
11 White House, United States National Security Strategy 2017 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government 
Printing Office, December 18, 2017), 8, https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/NSS-
Final-12-18-2017-0905.pdf. 
12 Robbie Gramer and Emily Tamkin, “Decades of U.S. Diplomacy with North Korea: A Timeline,” 
Foreign Policy (March 12, 2018), https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/03/12/a-timeline-of-u-s-negotiations-
talks-with-north-korea-trump-kim-jong-un-pyongyang-nuclear-weapons-diplomacy-asia-security/. 
13 Antonio Guterres, “Opening Remarks at Press Encounter,” United Nations Secretary-General, 
September 5, 2017, https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/sg/speeches/2017-09-05/secretary-generals-press-
encounter. 
14 Gramer and Tamkin, “Decades of U.S. Diplomacy with North Korea.” 
15 “Nuclear Weapons: Who Has What at a Glance,” Arms Control Association, accessed August 10, 
2018, https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/Nuclearweaponswhohaswhat. 
16 White House, United States National Security Strategy 2017, 8. 
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willingness to employ some type of WMDs both against their people and abroad 
exacerbates the risk. The Syrian government is a demonstrable case in point.17 In addition 
to the continued risk of WMD use against its own population, the fractured state of the 
Syrian government and the presence of terrorist organizations on its soil risk the spread of 
these weapons and chemicals to other terrorist organizations around the world.  
In addition to smaller belligerent powers, other near-peer states continue their 
efforts to mitigate U.S. interests around the globe and continue development of nuclear 
armaments and military advancements. The 2017 U.S. National Security Strategy identifies 
this and warns that, “China and Russia want to shape a world antithetical to U.S. values 
and interests ... [China’s] nuclear arsenal is growing and diversifying.” While, “Russia aims 
to weaken U.S. influence in the world and is investing in new military capabilities, 
including nuclear systems that remain the most significant existential threat to the United 
States.”18 The threat that these powers represent risks not only to U.S. national interests 
but also to the safety of the people in surrounding regions. Nuclear technologies and hostile 
governments threaten Eastern Europe in a manner similar to the threat posed by North 
Korea to countries throughout the South China Sea as well as South Korea and Japan.  
A. THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT 
We determined that any proposed solutions needed to be grounded in the realities 
of the current operational environment. Because of this we took into consideration the DoD 
mission command, and CWMD doctrine, as it guides and constrains our uses and 
implementation of solutions as well as the multi-domain nature of the environment its self.  
1. Doctrine 
Much of the existing CWMD doctrine is based on countering and addressing a near-
peer enemy and the concept of mutually assured destruction in the event of a nuclear 
incident. This doctrine and the accompanying mindset are dated in that they have 
                                                 
17 “Statement by the NATO Secretary General on the Actions against the Syrian Regime’s Chemical 
Weapons Facilities and Capabilities,” NATO, accessed August 22, 2018, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/
natohq/news_153661.htm. 
18 White House, United States National Security Strategy 2017, 25. 
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foundations set in an environment that is pre-internet, where there was a much lower level 
of interconnectivity and less anonymity.  
a. The Multi-Domain Environment 
From an operational environment perspective, the U.S. Army, the U.S. Marine 
Corps, and the DOD are taking notice about how the current CWMD problem set differs 
from Cold War-era doctrine. In a March 2017 Multi-Domain Battle (MDB) concept paper 
written by COL Bill Dries, strategist at the Air Staff’s Concept Division, indicates that all 
military services and U.S. government agencies are encouraging the DOD to “think, plan, 
and operate with a multi-domain approach.”19 Currently, we operate in five domains: 
maritime, air, land, space, and cyber. Moreover, it is these five domains that the U.S. 
military uses to define the requirements of the future force, to conduct planning, and to 
carry out joint operations.20 While the multi-domain approach to battle is not a new 
concept, a near-peer adversary’s ability to undermine our advantages is a recent 
development that threatens the United States and its allies and partners. For example, an 
effective cyber-attack, such as the one conducted against the Ukrainian power grid in 
December 2016, could disrupt the U.S. network architecture long enough for a state-level 
actor, such as North Korea or Russia, to seize the initiative. By using technology to its 
advantage, an adversary can now wage a multi-domain attack that is difficult to detect, 
attribute to a particular actor, and defend against; thus, reducing our military advantage and 
threatening national security.21 To counter these asymmetrical challenges that would deny 
us “operational access, basing, communications, and freedom of action,” we must 
accelerate the adoption and application of the MDB concept.22 
An August 2017 paper co-authored by GEN Robert B. Brown and GEN David G. 
Perkins expanded upon the MDB topics discussed by COL Dries. They contend that to be 
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prepared for the next war, the U.S. military “must effectively innovate and adapt concepts, 
equipment, and training … where integration into joint and multinational forces is a 
prerequisite for victory. To get there, we must establish a clear path to prepare the force for 
the fight tonight, tomorrow, and in the future.”23 The battle tonight and in the next five 
years will require the U.S. military to “employ existing forces, capabilities, and operational 
designs” while simultaneously “moving concept to doctrine in a way that guides 
technologically advanced weapons, systems, and modernized facilities with which to 
train.”24 The battle tomorrow, from 2022 to 2030, will require moving beyond our current 
capabilities in order to project our power globally and assure allies. The authors highlight 
that this requires a multi-domain task force that “will strike critical enemy targets with a 
combination of lethal and non-lethal means … protect friendly forces and critical nodes.”25 
b. Mission Command Doctrine 
In a multi-domain environment, it is incumbent upon a joint force to operate 
efficiently and effectively. The accomplishment of the mission and command and control 
or mission command is facilitated by mission command systems. Our primary focus is 
increasing mission command and C2 functions while developing a common operational 
picture at the JTF level. It is essential to understand the principles of the mission command 
and CWMD/CBRN tactics techniques and procedures, in both unilateral and multinational 
scenarios. 
Joint military and Army doctrine define mission command as a philosophy and a 
warfighting function; but, ultimately, it is a commander’s authority to lead, enable, and 
conduct operations. More specifically, through the mission command warfighting function, 
C2 of forces is enabled through mission command systems. These systems (personnel, 
networks, information systems, processes and procedures, and facilities and equipment) 
                                                 
23 Robert B. Brown and David G. Perkins, “Multi-Domain Battle: Tonight, Tomorrow, and the Future 
Fight,” War on the Rocks, August 18, 2018, https://warontherocks.com/2017/08/multi-domain-battle-
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24 Brown and Perkins. 
25 Brown and Perkins. 
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facilitate the development of a common operational picture and enable collaboration.26 
These systems provide commanders the information necessary to make critical decisions 
to apply forces and enablers in support of operations. 
Multinational operations present numerous information challenges that 
commanders must overcome to conduct operations successfully. While information 
sharing is a critical aspect of multinational operations, the inability to do so hampers 
effectiveness. JP 3–16 discusses international standardization and interoperability as an 
essential part of cooperation and mission success. Although interoperability and 
standardization pertain to other areas of military operations such as doctrine, procedures, 
and training, they are most frequently identified with communications and technology. The 
ability of multinational partners to communicate and share information and intelligence in 
a timely matter can often determine the success of operations.27 The U.S. Army recognizes 
this, and despite significant efforts toward resolution, technical interoperability remains a 
significant challenge in the conduct of multinational operations. The U.S. Army’s Program 
Executive Office for Command Control and Communications-Tactical (PEO C3T) is 
working toward not only transforming U.S. C4I systems that prioritize interoperability but 
also assisting coalition partners. One venue PEO C3T utilizes to determine interoperability 
requirements is during the conduct of multinational warfighting exercises. These exercises 
represent not only an evaluation opportunity for new U.S. systems but also the testing of 
interoperability with partner systems. The Director of Communications and Congressional 
Affairs for PEO C3T, Paul Mehney, describes the lack of a single coalition network or 
standard as a longstanding issue. Each coalition partner has its requirements, baselines, and 
standards to meet its unique network requirements, missions, and capabilities.28 
                                                 
26 Department of the Army, Mission Command, ADP 6–0 (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 
2014), iv. 
27 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Multinational Operations, JP 3–16 (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 
2013), I-6. 
28 Paul D. Mehney, “U.S. Army Marches Toward Coalition Interoperability,” Signals, March 2018. 
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c. CWMD Doctrine 
As operations and challenges increasingly overlap multiple domains, issues 
involving WMD and CBRN threats require more JIIM resources, and the need for effective 
command and control of forces, interoperability, and a common operational picture 
becomes necessary. JIIM collaboration and the involvement of numerous other 
organizations create unique challenges for obtaining accurate situational awareness of the 
operational environment.29 ADP 6–0, Mission Command, identifies the development of a 
shared understanding as a critical task but defining challenge for commanders, staffs, and 
forces in the conduct of operations.30 Networks and information systems are critical 
components of this because they are the primary means by which commanders leverage 
connectivity to control forces, apply assets, and share their understanding of the situation 
to higher echelons of command for strategic decision-making. 
2. Evolution of the TAK 
a. What Is The TAK? 
The Tactical Assault Kit (TAK) is a tactical software solution that facilitates 
situational awareness (SA) and command and control (C2) through Global Positioning 
System (GPS) and associated map data. The TAK displays user-defined mission-specific 
information using military standard iconography, and live-data streams. It does this by 
incorporating Cursor on Target (CoT) data format standards that allow communication and 
data dissemination across multiple communication substrates. The TAK is currently a 
program of record managed by the U.S. Special Operation Command, and is under constant 
development by industry and defense research labs, to meet end-user requirements.31  
In 2010, Air Force Research Labs (AFRL), Army Research Lab (ARL), The 
Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), in conjunction with industry 
research partners, began developing a SA tool based on the Android platform of mobile 
                                                 
29 Joint Chiefs of Staff, “Multinational Operations (JP 3–16),” I-6. 
30 Department of the Army, Mission Command, 3. 
31 “Home,” TAK, accessed August 23, 2018, https://takmaps.com/. 
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devices to meet the variety of end-user size, weight, and power requirements (SWaP).32 
The tactical-level Android variant of the TAK, ATAK (Android Tactical Assault Kit), 
quickly gained popularity within the special operations community, and feedback along 
with mission-specific requirements drove the development of additional capabilities. 
Open-source coding allows significant input from the tech community to meet additional 
need requirements through extensions known as plug-ins. Since its inception, the ATAK’s 
focus on end-user capability has produced more than 90 plug-ins developed by partner 
organizations to meet specific requirements. These additional applications include video, 
chat, causality evacuation (CASEVAC), Call for Fire, Digitally Aided Close Air Support 
(DACAS) 9 Line, and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) sensor 
control.33 
Tactical-level SA is not a new idea; it was the focus of the Army’s Land and Net 
Warrior programs. However, a significant difference between those programs and the 
ATAK is the ATAK’s readily available coding, which has enabled a vast network of 
developers to contribute solutions. The software’s availability, compared to a proprietary 
system, has allowed the constant development of the ATAK and the TAK network to meet 
a variety of demands as well as be continuously upgraded to account for evolving 
technologies and hardware platforms. The ATAK’s utility is also its ability to communicate 
across multiple communication substrates and among multiple other programs and 
systems. The TAK’s network ability to receive and transmit multiple simple and complex 
message and data formats facilitates its communication with the various technologies found 
on today’s battlefield. This is accomplished by directly programming the enabling 
technologies’ messaging format during plug-in development or by utilizing multiple file 
format languages organic to the TAK, particularly the Cursor on Target coding, language, 
and message routing concepts. According to the MITRE Corporation:  
The Cursor-On-Target (CoT) data strategy centers on the use of a “common 
language” for tactical systems that is critical in communicating much 
                                                 
32 Kyle Usbeck et al., “Improving Situation Awareness with the Android Team Awareness Kit 
(ATAK),” ed. Edward M. Carapezza, 2015, 5, https://doi.org/10.1117/12.2180014. 
33 Josh Sterling, “TAK LSE Brief,” Milsuite (PowerPoint, USSOCOM 2018 TAK Working Group, 
Pinehurst, North Carolina, August 13, 2018), https://www.milsuite.mil/books/groups/2018-tak-off-site. 
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needed time sensitive position information. Analogous to functioning 
acceptably in foreign countries, while only learning a few important words 
of the native language, CoT starts with a focus on a particular set of 
important common information on the battlefield. This is seen as a time 
sensitive position or the “What, When, and Where” (W3) of a specific event. 
The proof of concept prototype also allows for structured special purpose 
extensions.34 
The continuous demand for the ATAKs and its flexibility to adapt to user-specific 
requirements led to the expansion of the TAK network to include Windows (WinTAK), 
web-based (WebTAK), and civilian (ATAK-Civ) versions.35 
• WinTAK is a Windows operating system TAK-variant developed in 
conjunction with the ATAK to provide similar functionality on a PC or 
Windows platform. 
• ATAK-Civ was developed for use on the Android platform to meet U.S. 
federal, state, local, and first responder requirements. 
• WebTAK is a server-hosted version of the TAK available for use through 
a web browser.  
The continued interest and easily accessible development solutions of the TAK 
network have resulted in a robust capability that continues to gain traction within the 
defense and related communities. Its low cost of entry and evolving software infrastructure 
adapts to changing technology, and hardware requirements make it a solution likely to 
endure.  
                                                 
34 Michael J. Kristan et al., “Cursor-on-Target Message Router User’s Guide,” MITRE Corporation, 
2009, 2.1, https://www.mitre.org/sites/default/files/pdf/09_4937.pdf. 
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annotated the use of ATAK applies to either version. Similarly our use of the term TAK is describing the 
whole network or versions, platforms, and capabilities.  
18 
b. The TAK’s Contribution to RAA 
The evolution of remote, advise and assist (RAA) technology began in late 2014 
with the development of Virtual Accompany Kits by Special Operations Command Central 
(SOCCENT). Initial efforts for virtual technology were motivated by U.S. policy 
restrictions limiting U.S. Special Operations Forces (USSOF) from accompanying and 
being physically present with Iraqi Special Operations Forces (ISOF) in the battle against 
Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS). At the request of Special Forces detachments in Iraq, 
SOCCENT J3 Operations Technology Directorate assisted in the development and filling 
of initial requirements. The first generation of Virtual Accompany Kits consisted of 
Samsung smartphones preloaded with the International Traffic in Arms Regulation-
compliant version of the ATAK, MyTrax. The Iraq domestic cellular network and a 
Broadband Global Area Network (BGAN) satellite communications node facilitated 
connectivity and data flow.36 This first phase, or prototype—Virtual Accompany Kits—
and their role in immediate battlefield successes paved the way for increased development 
and refinement of the RAA concept. They enabled USSOF to maintain SA and advise and 
assist partner tactical units despite our physically remote presence.  
As interest continued to grow in 2015 and funding was secured, the Naval 
Postgraduate School began testing myriad commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) products 
focused on improving the operability of the system. Phase two prototypes included 
upgrades and incorporation of equipment inherently designed to increase integration with 
each other. The Android-based smartphones now contained integrated satellite on-the-
move capability, on-the-move mapping solutions, and a commercial laser range finder that 
significantly expanded the end-user range data flow and functionality.37 The Special 
Operational Detachment-Alphas (SFOD-A) and Combined Joint Special Operations Task 
Force- Iraq (CJSOTF-I), newly capable of reliably tracking ISOF partner positions, were 
able to develop and share a common operational picture of the battlefield. This clarity 
                                                 
36 Christopher Thielenhaus, Pat Traeger, and Eric Roles, “Reaching Forward in the War against the 
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provided the ability to provide operational fires and needed support through reliable two-
way communication during operations against ISIS, resulting in the successful integration 
of these RAA kits into the CJSOTF-I (Figure 2).  
 
Figure 2. RAA concept38 
The ATAK’s flexibility to adapt to user-specific requirements has led to its 
continued adoption by multiple U.S. government agencies at the federal and state levels, 
as well as numerous foreign militaries. Most notably, the ATAK was used to provide C2 
to over 2300 officers and agents from nine different militaries and federal, state, and local 
law enforcement agencies during the 2017 presidential inauguration.39 In the aftermath of 
Hurricane Harvey, Air Force Special Tactics Squadrons, the National Guard, and other first 
responders utilized the ATAK to coordinate emergency recovery efforts.40 These use-case 
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scenarios represent the TAK network’s ability to adapt to large-scale network demands 
over vast geographic areas as well as meet information and diverse support requirements.  
3. Other C4I Systems for Mission Command 
a. U.S. Army C4I  
When evaluating C4I systems, there are four areas to consider: the method of data 
transmission (i.e., radio, internet service provider [ISP], cellular, satellite communications 
[SATCOM]); the hardware required to run the applications; the software applications 
themselves; and the ability to integrate additional resources, sensors, and capabilities 
depending on the problem set. 
The method of data transmission is both a strength and a weakness regarding 
current programs used by the DoD. Programs like Warfighter Information Network-
Tactical, which now encompasses a multitude of network types, still suffer the shortfalls 
that affect other U.S. systems in a JIIM environment.41 These shortfalls are twofold. First, 
it is difficult to share the same COP with partner nations due to the classification levels of 
the networks used. Some systems try to mitigate this shortfall, with various chat programs 
and joint blue force tracking. Unfortunately, these systems often suffer from a lack of use 
on both sides. Partner and allied nation forces are reluctant to populate the COP with their 
own unit positions when U.S. units do not trust the less restrictive system with U.S. blue 
force positions and information. The second is the restricted bandwidth that is a result of 
remote or austere conditions where the DoD often operates. Many of the newer C4I systems 
have the capability to function across multiple substrates, circumventing the bottleneck of 
classified communications by using a shared network.  
The next C4I system area of concern faced by the DoD is hardware and software. 
The military, in general, is fond of proprietary solutions vice COTS solutions. This creates 
the problem of proprietary hardware and software that does not adapt to keep pace with 
technology. It constrains the user to specific platforms and software packages provided by 
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the company contracted for the initial solution. This is also problematic because many of 
these systems are not designed to interface with other C4I systems, which may have 
different manufacturers. The systems are also not always designed to link together to form 
a cohesive COP. That must be done external to the system by someone on a watch floor or 
in a JOC/Tactical Operations Center (TOC). Ideally, these systems would allow for 
upgrades to hardware and software in the same manner as a conventional home computer. 
Users can replace components or the hardware entirely and still run the same software, or 
upgrade both, and move their data over to a new system. There is cross-platform 
compatibility across versions, and it is easy to install additional software/plug-ins that 
allow added functionality depending on the desired use case. 
The U.S. Army has taken initial steps to alleviate this problem by contracting with 
Systemic Inc. for its SITAWARE suite of C2 programs, which will soon form the 
foundation of the Army’s Mounted Computing Environment (MCE).42  
(1) SITAWARE 
SITAWARE, a commercial system currently in use by Danish, Swedish, and 
Spanish forces, does come close to meeting these requirements.43 The DoD recognized the 
success of this system and, in early 2018, the Army decided to use Systemic’s SITAWARE 
C2 suite, “as the backbone of its developing Mounted Computing Environment (MCE).”44  
SITAWARE addresses the need to have a common C2 system and messaging 
structure from the tactical to the operational level, including a shared COP.45 The system 
can be used over almost any communications equipment it is plugged into, whether it be 
radio, cellular, or ISP. Furthermore, the system is designed so that the data packets are very 
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small, approximately 3 to 10 bytes, which allows for more robust communication on low-
bandwidth networks or in austere environments with limited connectivity that might result 
in packet loss.46  
While SITAWARE allows for partial solutions by providing basic data transfer of 
COP and communication information from tactical units to mid-level and finally 
operational-level HQs, it falls short when integrating sensor information, including outside 
inputs into the overall COP, or allowing the reach back to SMEs.47 The capacity exists for 
the SITAWARE network to transfer data from any type of sensor or piece of equipment 
that can be connected to a field radio; however, it does not fuse the information provided 
by the equipment into the overall COP. SITAWARE comes close to being an ideal solution 
but falls short simply due to the nature of its origin; it is a contracted system from a single 
supplier.48  
(2) Joint Operational Level CBRN/CWMD C4I Systems 
The current guidance for joint operations concerning countering weapons of mass 
destruction, Joint Publication 3–40, Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction, makes no 
mention of the systems used for C2, C4, or C4ISR.49 This is not surprising, since it 
provides strategic, or at best, operational-level guidance. At the tactical level, the current 
CBRN/CWMD systems outlined in the latest update—October 31, 2013—to the ATP 3–
11.36, Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques and Procedures for Chemical, Biological, 
Radiological, and Nuclear Aspects of Command and Control, are often specific to one 
portion of the C4ISR structure. Because of this, the systems lack interconnectivity to a 
unified operating system that is accessible from both the operational and tactical levels. In 
a CBRN scenario that requires multiple sensors, “many CBRN agent detector and alarm 
arrays operate as independent units; therefore, when a CBRN attack is detected, only those 
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personnel in the immediate vicinity hear the alarm. Adjacent units need to be notified by 
radio, wire communications, audible means, or verbal means.”50 
Furthermore, many of the current CBRN/CWMD C4I systems communicate using 
classified methods, which inhibit JIIM interoperability and complicate coordination among 
JIIM units. Following are brief descriptions that show the reactive mindset inherent in most 
of these systems. These systems are designed primarily for use at the operational level; 
there is little to no integration with tactical level units.  
JWARN: Joint Warning and Reporting System 
The JWARN primarily provides an integrated early warning 
capability, an IM system, and a capability to analyze the OE. It provides the 
capability to query and disseminate critical, time-sensitive CBRN defense 
information throughout the OE to enhance overall force protection. There 
are five primary mission essential functions performed by JWARN: SA, 
warning, reporting, hazard prediction; and “basic” battle management 
analysis. The JWARN implements these functionalities to provide an 
enhanced CBRN defense capability for the warfighter.51 
JEM: Joint Effects Model 
The JEM provides a single, DOD-approved methodology and model 
that provides a common representation of CBRN hazard areas and effects 
resulting from CBRN weapons and TIM. Operationally, JEM supports 
operational and crisis action planning to mitigate the effects of WMD, to 
include weapons with CBRN payloads and accidental TIM releases. 
Additionally, JEM assists DOD components and allied or coalition forces 
by providing CBRN and TIM hazard predictions and effects to the 
warfighter during and after an incident. Analytically, JEM assists DOD 
components and allied or coalition forces to train jointly develop doctrine 
and tactics; and assess warfighting, technology, material development 
proposals, and force structure. The JEM is interoperable with selected 
command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence (C4I) 
systems. Software applications on those C4I systems (JWARN) use JEM to 
provide an enhanced prediction of hazard areas to provide a detailed 
warning to U.S. forces within those areas. Operational effects systems on 
those C4I systems (JOEF) uses JEM to predict hazard areas. JEM may also 
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be operated as a stand-alone application that is not interfaced or networked 
with a C4I system.52 
JOEF: Joint Operational Effects Federation 
The JOEF “provides automated decision support tools that enable 
the joint force commander to more effectively and efficiently assess risk 
and allocate scarce resources in preparation for and during operations 
involving CBRN and [toxic industrial materials] (TIM) hazards.”53 
(3) Tactical-Level CBRN Systems  
In terms of a dedicated CBRN response unit, the U.S. Army National Guard has 
Stationed Weapons of Mass Destruction Civil Support Teams (CTS) in all 50 states.54 In 
the event of a chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, or high-yield explosives incident, 
these teams provide support to domestic authorities.55 
The mission statement of the National Guard’s Civil Support Teams is:  
Identifying CBRN agents/substances, assessing current or projected 
consequences, advising on response measures, and assisting with 
appropriate requests for additional follow-on state and federal military 
forces. Units can also provide immediate response for intentional and 
unintentional CBRN or hazardous material (HAZMAT) releases and natural 
or manmade disasters that result in, or could result in, catastrophic loss of 
life or property.56 
Because these teams deal specifically with the CBRN/CWMD mission set, they 
require a C4I system that is tailored to that mission set. For example, the 95th Civil Support 
Team uses the Adobe connect conferencing tool as an ad hoc cloud-based collaboration 
system to provide a basic form of C2 and SA. However, it lacks the interoperability and 
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capability of a true C4I or even a C2 system. Currently, the best solution for these teams is 
the Mobile Field Kit-CBRN (MFK-CBRN).57 
MFK-CBRN, or simply MFK is a program developed by the DRTA to meet the 
needs of Civil Support Teams (CSTs). MFK allows for commanders to monitor specific 
details about the operators on the ground, such as the amount of air remaining in the 
operators’ tanks and the battery charge level in various connected devices. An additional 
benefit of MFK is that it communicates with the ATAK, appearing as another ATAK server 
that can pass data across the ATAK network. This adds expanded functionality for CBRN-
specific units that require and understand the additional data provided by MFK, while still 
allowing them to work in conjunction with Army SOF units that have a tactical-level 
ATAK network.  
(4) ATAK CBRN Capability 
With CBRN-specific data aggregation and C2 management systems already in use 
by U.S. forces, why does the USSOF community need to use the ATAK for a possible 
CBRN/CWMD response? Because the ATAK is already in use by USSOF, while there are 
CBRN specific solutions, they would require additional equipment. SOF units responding 
to this mission set would benefit most by leveraging their current equipment to integrate 
CBRN sensors into their COP. With the CBRN plug-in, the ATAK allows this. The 
growing threat of a nuclear crisis in the DPRK means there is an ever-increasing possibility 
that the action required from USSOCOM and JIIM partners will be proactive in nature. 
These actions will require the capability to coordinate traditional U.S. and partner SOF 
units to gain and maintain control over DPRK CBRN assets and infrastructure before a 
nuclear incident or loss of control can occur. This will require C4ISR capabilities not 
currently available in the standard C2/C4/C4ISR systems. As USSOCOM attempts to 
determine what a coordinated action against the North Korean infrastructure and assets will 
look like, it is readily apparent that this problem set will require a tactical C4ISR system 
different from traditional, operational-level only systems. 
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The ATAK retains its flexibility no matter the use case because it can be loaded 
onto any hardware that will run on the Android operating system. It can communicate 
across any network that allows data transfer as long as the hardware has a connection 
method. Plug-ins are easy to write because the ATAK uses a common commercially 
available operating system. This flexibility of network and hardware usage means that it 
can be used on a network with partner nations over joint coms, or configured to work at a 
higher classification by using secure comms. While it is likely that SOF units will play a 
separate part in any operation, they still require the ability to integrate with the larger Army 
C4I systems to accomplish their mission.  
B. IMPLICATIONS OF TECHNOLOGY INTEGRATION AND THE TAK 
Sensors in CWMD operations are essential as they allow commanders to make 
decisions and SMEs to see technical data remotely in near real-time and make technical 
recommendations to the operator beyond his organic capability. As outlined in JP 3–11, 
Operations in Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Environment, “the 
necessity for JFCs and staff to have the ability to share information and create a shared 
understanding allows informed and timely decisions amid massive quantities of operational 
data.”58 ATP 3–05.11, Special Operations Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and 
Nuclear Operations, discusses offensive CWMD operations and the requirement of SOF 
chemical reconnaissance detachments conducting WMD interdiction and elimination 
operations. The chemical reconnaissance detachments must not only have the capability to 
detect and identify WMD agents and radioactive sources but also the capability to 
communicate results to a maneuver commander in near real time.59 The requirements for 
SME and RAA capability beyond the JOC change in response to time requirements, 
independent variables of each operation, or even the availability of SMEs to accompany 
operators or be a part of the joint force HQ.  
                                                 
58 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Operations in Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Environments, 
III-1. 
59 Department of the Army, Special Operations Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear 
Operations, ATP 3–05.11 (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 2014), 2–2. 
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There are three levels of identification for possible radiological source in the field: 
presumptive identification, field confirmation identification, and theater validation 
identification.60 Theater validation identification requires the employment of “multiple 
independent, established protocols and technologies by scientific experts from a fixed or 
mobile laboratory to characterize a CBRN threat with a high level of confidence and the 
degree of certainty necessary to support operational level decisions.”61 The advancement 
of sensor technology and connectivity of the modern SOF operator and the JOC will allow 
for increased capabilities and validation by scientific experts. This capability will increase 
the commander’s ability to better understand threats, make timely decisions, and share 
strategic information for follow-on policy.  
1. Tools Necessary for JIIM CWMD Operations 
As adversaries present new and different dynamic problems and challenges around 
the world, SOCOM must be prepared to adapt and provide measured responses. Previous 
research addressed combined operations and advising a partner force to improve its 
                                                 
60 Department of the Army, Multi-Service Tactics Techniques and Procedures for Chemical 
Biological Radiological and Nuclear Reconnaissance And Surveillance, ATP 3–11.37 (Washington, DC: 
Department of the Army, 2013), 5–3–5-6. 
ATP 3–11.37 defines the three categories as follows and includes a fourth category, definitive 
identification, which must be performed in a national laboratory:  
“Presumptive identification is the employment of technologies with limited specificity and sensitivity 
by general-purpose forces in a field environment to determine the presence of a chemical, biological, 
radiological, and/or nuclear hazard with a low level of confidence and the degree of certainty necessary to 
support immediate tactical decisions” 5–3. 
“Field confirmatory identification is the employment of technologies with increased specificity and 
sensitivity by technical forces in a field environment to identify chemical, biological, radiological, and/or 
nuclear hazards with a moderate level of confidence and the degree of certainty necessary to support 
follow-on tactical decisions” 5–5. 
“Theater validation identification is the employment of multiple independent, established protocols 
and technologies by scientific experts in the controlled environment of a fixed or mobile/transportable 
laboratory to characterize a chemical, biological, radiological, and/or nuclear hazard with a high level of 
confidence and the degree of certainty necessary to support operational level decisions” 5–6. 
“Definitive identification is the employment of multiple state-of-the-art, independent, established 
protocols and technologies by scientific experts in a nationally recognized laboratory to determine the 
unambiguous identity of a chemical, biological, radiological, and/or nuclear hazard with the highest level of 
confidence and degree of certainty necessary to support strategic-level decisions” 5–7. 
61 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Operations in Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Environments, 
B-8. 
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effectiveness and lethality through the digital presence of U.S. Special Forces advisors 
using RAA/ADAPT. Situations like a possible instability in nuclear-armed North Korea, 
or the illegal sale of fissile or radiological material, pose new challenges and require special 
technical expertise and greater involvement of JIIM partners. Through the proven ATAK 
and the TAK infrastructures, the possibility exists to integrate emerging technologies at the 
tactical level, enhance operator effectiveness, and provide relevant technology to the 
battlefield, and increase operational and JIIM SA. The opportunity has arisen to scale 
tactical level technology up to the operational level for C2, facilitating technical advising, 
and providing a common operating picture. 
The creation of the JOCTAK and the integration of CBRN sensors reimagines the 
RAA concept for use during unilateral CWMD operations, where the SFOD-A requires 
technical expertise beyond the scope of the team or personnel present on the JOC floor. 
The traditional construct of RAA was a partner force conducting an operation would 
receive technical advice from a forward-staged Special Forces detachment who had reach 
back capability to the joint HQ for mission support as required. The unilateral CWMD 
operations construct facilitated by the JOCTAK provides a similar framework. While the 
JOC is able to provide much of the warfighting capabilities, any technical requirements— 
chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear—could quickly exceed the expertise found 
within the JOC and require scientific subject matter expertise. For example, from a 
particular scientist or identification and processing capability at a nuclear research facility 
located in the continental United States or a North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) 
partner country.  
In the context of unilateral CWMD operations and utilizing the TAK infrastructure 
as a comprehensive C4I platform, the original tactical level functionality of the ATAK to 
advise a partner nation will require significant adaptation. JOC requirements include the 
ability to track and observe multiple elements from different network enclaves, send and 
receive voice and data communications, receive and view multiple ISR feeds, and access 
planning documents. 
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C. CONCLUSION  
Comparison of the requirements to achieve the most effective level of JIIM 
interoperability necessary for a comprehensive CWMD response, and the lack of available 
systems to implement a response during a CWMD mission set, highlights significant gaps 
between the current capability and the desired end state. While the strategic and policy 
guidance for such operations is easy to state, performing such tasks while coordinating 
with partners is a separate matter and one that currently has no real-world solution. Due to 
the explicit threat of a CWMD event, it is essential that existing technologies and systems 




THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
31 
III. TAK APPLIED AS A PROOF OF CONCEPT FOR CWMD C4I 
A. MULTI-DOMAIN, MULTILATERAL COLLABORATION 
OPPORTUNITIES 
In order to address the use of the TAK as an operational level C4I mission command 
system and CBRN tool, we parsed the problem into two areas for further research and 
development. First is the feasibility of the TAK to function as an operational-level C4I tool, 
JOCTAK. Second is the ATAK’s integration of CBRN sensor technology into tactical 
operations. Experimentation was conducted through an iterative ground-up approach 
spanning multiple field experiments. Initial experimentation tested and confirmed the 
ATAK and TAK networks’ ability to aggregate, share, and display tactical-level 
information across a network. Follow-on experiments tested the integration of CBRN 
sensors into the network using the ATAK CBRN plug-in and its ability to host multiple 
nodes of users with various sensors. Similarly, an operations center was established 
concurrently with all experiments to replicate information requirements, and observe and 
record end-user implications. Using this approach, we identified specific areas of strength 
and concern regarding the expansion of the TAK to an operational-level C4I system for 
CWMD operations.  
The development of a JOCTAK as a comprehensive CWMD C4I solution should 
include the re-development of current software and plug-ins to ensure inter-platform 
compatibility across the entire TAK network. Although a significant undertaking, this will 
allow for the most comprehensive aggregation of mission data and a viable starting point 
for the development of a JOCTAK. Because of the variety of CBRN sensors fielded within 
the U.S. government and partner forces, the ATAK CBRN plug-in must be able to translate 
and communicate with all existing U.S. and partner CBRN sensor and C2 program file 
formats. Additionally, access to the JOCTAK from a remote location through a web portal 
could provide significant advantages to the way critical information is shared with SMEs 
and stakeholder organizations. This level of tactical and operational visibility would 
facilitate both commanders and staff to visualize multiple complex operations across the 
battlefield and make timely decisions. The JOCTAK’s significance is that it solves existing 
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command-level capability gaps with reliable and known systems. Its further development 
enables tactical level operations while providing increase reachback support. While this 
research provides a definite way forward for SOJTF CWMD operations, it has far-reaching 
implications in a multi-domain JIIM environment where requirements for data flow and 
information necessary for continuous operations continue to increase. 
1. CWMD Potential Operations 
The scale of a nuclear crisis on the Korean Peninsula would likely exceed the 
capricious number of U.S. special operations forces (SOF) and conventional CBRN units 
available to respond. In the event of a CWMD incident/crisis involving the Democratic 
People’s Republic of Korea, a JIIM response will be required.62 U.S. CBRN units are 
available to respond on a two-hour recall; however, they are limited in number. Even with 
South Korean or other allied country partner units, the number required would likely still 
greatly outweigh the number of units available. Because of this, there is a high likelihood 
a conventional unit that is untrained in CBRN/CWMD will encounter or be tasked to deal 
with CBRN material and require the reach back advice and subject matter expertise.  
The coordination and monitoring of both U.S. and allied/partner forces involved in 
a CWMD mission set will require an unprecedented level of collaboration and information 
sharing at the operational level, both to assist individual units with the required information 
from SMEs and to coordinate the movement of all of the units in concert. Additionally, the 
economic and diplomatic connectivity of Eastern Asia highlights the number of non-U.S. 
stakeholders in the event of a DPRK CWMD crisis, which will further complicate the 
necessary coordination. 
a. Vignettes  
While the possibility of an actual CBRN attack is not a pleasant scenario to imagine, 
it is one that must be trained for. Given the complex environment of CWMD operations, 
there will certainly be many different elements involved with any CWMD operation. These 
elements could be solely within the Department of Defense or expand to include other 
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government and civilian agencies. The Army Training Publication (ATP) 3–90.40, 
Combined Arms Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction, which is a collection of Army 
CWMD operations lessons learned, clearly states that “CWMD is not a CBRN specialty 
mission set enabled by maneuver forces: rather, it is a military operation conducted by 
combined arms teams and enabled by CBRN specialists, EOD, and other technical 
elements.”63 This means that units of all types, regardless of expertise, are likely to be 
involved. 
Given the size and scope of any possible CWMD operation, the number of units/
agencies involved, including the DOD, would be in the dozens if not more. The need for 
an efficient way to communicate, battle track, and share information among multiple units 
at both the tactical and operational levels is imperative for a successful operation. This 
information sharing would need to consist of pictures, videos, troop location data, and 
CWMD sensor data, all simultaneously shared across a network. Focusing on the sharing 
of CWMD sensor data, leaders at both the tactical and operational levels could benefit from 
the ability to view the same sensor readings, track all units on a universal COP, and receive 
assistance from SMEs located outside the JOC/HQ. A system capable of handling all of 
the tasks laid out above would have to be integrated and work across various platforms 
including multiple mobile devices. Additionally, it would need to be compatible with the 
equipment and CWMD sensors used by a large variety of agencies. The following notional 
scenario is what a possible operation might look like with the C4I systems currently in use 
today. 
(1) Vignette One, without the TAK 
Negotiations with the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea have continued to 
stall, and the United States along with its allied partners have deployed a large number of 
additional units to the Korean Peninsula. The Special Operations Joint Task Force Korea 
has been established to search out and render safe all WMD areas, whether they be 
manufacturing, assembly, or launch sites, in case the regime collapses.  
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Special Forces Operation Detachment-Alpha XXXX deploys across the forward 
line of troops (FLOT) into the DPRK following the collapse of the regime and discovers a 
previously unconfirmed WMD missile site. The SFOD-A conducts reconnaissance on the 
area and requests ISR to gather imagery and other information from the air. After 
conducting reconnaissance, they assemble out of sight and sound of security forces to 
consolidate information. They sketch maps of each side of the missile site, list how many 
security forces were seen, what types of weapons and vehicles were observed, and note 
any additional structures that were in the area, as well as the roads leading into and out of 
the objective.  
Recon Team 1 mentions seeing a large number of metal drums stacked under an 
open shed-like structure and notes they appear to have hazardous material markings. Recon 
Team 2 observes a possible disassembled rocket with the accompanying warhead, engine 
components, and other unknown parts. Only Recon Team 1 observed the structure and 
drums because none of the other recon elements could see the structure from their vantage 
point. The SFOD-A compiles their reconnaissance data and then contacts the SOJTF HQ 
to report their findings along with a request to destroy the entire site. The SOJTF HQ tells 
the SFOD-A to remain in place while the ISR footage is examined. 
An hour later, the SOJTF HQ contacts the SFOD-A via a satellite communications 
(SATCOM) voice radio, informing them that the ISR platform confirmed the missile type 
as one that is possibly carrying a nuclear payload. Therefore, it appears to be a warhead, 
and the drums contain nuclear material. The SOJTF informs the SFOD-A that they will 
have to wait for an airstrike because the risk of contaminating the surrounding environment 
must be evaluated. Meanwhile, at the SOJTF HQ, the Chemical staff cannot positively 
identify the missile system or components and sends a request for advanced SME 
assistance in the identification process. It takes an additional hour for the HQ to request 
assistance from a U.S. defense nuclear research and testing facility for positive 
identification of the weapons system and likely components. It is ultimately determined 
that the missile components and metal drums pose no threat of contaminating the area as 
long as they are not directly targeted during the airstrike. The higher HQ passes this 
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information down to the SOJTF HQ, which in turn relays the information down to the 
SFOD-A.  
The SFOD-A then provides all the necessary targeting information for the airstrike 
to the SOJTF HQ and sets up in an ambush position to eliminate any enemy combatants 
that attempt to evade once the airstrike begins. Fifteen minutes later, the airstrike destroys 
most of the compound except for the shed-like structure, and the SFOD-A subsequently 
eliminates all other enemies on the target. The SOJTF HQ tasks the SFOD-A to conduct a 
post-strike battle damage assessment and analyze the remaining missile and drum using 
specialized CBRN sensors. As part of the CWMD task force, each detachment operating 
in the area was issued CBRN sensors in the event that they encountered any WMD material. 
After completing this task, the SFOD-A moves back to the SOJTF HQ for debriefing and 
passes the CBRN sensor readings off to the SOJTF HQ CBRN detachment for analysis. It 
is determined that discovered parts and components do contain a low-grade nuclear 
material and could have been reassembled to create a short-range surface-to-surface-
missile. The total time from initial discovery of the weapons site to mission completion 
was nine hours.  
This notional story depicts a situation any SOF unit could experience on the Korean 
Peninsula. During the course of this hypothetical situation, there were several instances 
where the capability to aggregate and share various forms of data and information among 
tactical units, the JOC, and SMEs would have been extremely beneficial to the tactical unit 
on the ground. The capability to meet these requirements already exists in some form 
within the TAK network; however, it requires an expansion of existing software 
capabilities. 
(2) Vignette Two, with the TAK 
In the previous vignette, we discussed what a possible scenario might look like with 
today’s C4I systems. This is what it may look like with the addition of the TAK 
infrastructure.  
SFOD-A XXXX deploys to the DPRK following the collapse of the regime on the 
Korean Peninsula as part of SOJTF Korea. While on patrol, the SFOD-A discovers a 
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previously unknown WMD missile site. The SFOD-A begins conducting reconnaissance 
on the area as well as request ISR to gather imagery and other information from the air. 
While conducting reconnaissance, each member of the SFOD-A is equipped with an 
ATAK device and can see each team member’s position on the ground in real time. Because 
both recon teams were updating their observations in real time with map markers, military 
symbology, and the chat function, each recon team and remaining members of the 
detachment were aware of one another’s observations. The JOCTAK allowed the SOJTF 
HQ to monitor the same live and still images of the facility and observed equipment from 
the detachment. After the detachment finished conducting reconnaissance, they 
reconsolidate out of sight and sound of the missile site to review the ISR footage and add 
observer-specific information and details to the final report before sending it forward along 
with a request to strike the entire stronghold.  
The consolidated information sent over the TAK network to the SOJTF HQ 
provides the amplifying details necessary for personnel at the SOJTF HQ to begin 
analyzing the site and components remotely. The Chemical Corp staff cannot positively 
identify the drums, materials, or components and requests advanced SME assistance in the 
identification process. The SOJTF staff contacts a U.S.-based defense nuclear research and 
testing facility that is granted access to the network over the internet to positively identify 
the weapons system and components. After analyzing the photos of the missile site sent by 
the SFOD-A, the SME positively identifies the missile system and components and can 
quickly determine that the materials pose no threat of contaminating the area as long as 
they are not directly targeted during the airstrike. Utilizing the JOCTAK, in a matter of 
seconds, the higher headquarters passes this information to the SFOD-A.  
Unlike the previous scenario, the SOJTF HQ is much more responsive in 
authorizing the airstrike request because of enhanced SA of the objective from input from 
the SFOD-A and ISR. The SFOD-A provides all the necessary targeting information for 
the airstrike via the ATAK and establishes an ambush to eliminate any enemy forces that 
attempt to escape once the airstrike begins. Fifteen minutes later, when the detachment is 
able to get into position, the airstrike destroys most of the compound, minus the covered 
area, and the SFOD-A eliminates all other enemies on the target. The SOJTF HQ tasks the 
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SFOD-A with analyzing the metal drums and missile components using specialized CBRN 
sensors. As part of the CWMD Task Force, each detachment operating in the area was 
issued CBRN sensors in the event that they encountered any WMD material. These 
specialized sensors are connected to the ATAK and allow both the SOJTF and higher HQ 
to monitor the sensor data remotely through the JOCTAK. This allows the CBRN SMEs 
to quickly analyze the drums and components to determine if they are a threat and the HQ 
element to quickly warn the SFOD-A of any contamination issues and advise them to leave 
the objective area if necessary. After completion of this task, the SFOD-A moves back to 
the SOJTF HQ for debriefing.  
Because the ATAK facilitates real-time monitoring of CBRN sensor data, the time 
necessary for analysis is significantly expedited. It is determined that the metal drums do 
contain a low-grade nuclear material sufficient enough to pose a threat if assembled with 
the other missile components found on the objective to create short-range surface-to-
surface projectiles. The total time from initial discovery of the weapons site to mission 
completion was two hours. TAK’s ability to aggregate and share information to the relevant 
parties at both the SFOD-A and HQ levels reduced the elapsed time of the operation by 
more than 75%. 
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IV. EXPERIMENTS 
A. TEST I: NELLIS AFB, SEPTEMBER 2017 
1. Experiment Design Considerations 
In September 2017, we conducted experimentation at Nellis Air Force Base (AFB) 
as the first phase of an iterative approach toward validating the use of the ATAK as an 
operational- and tactical-level SA tool. The purpose of this experiment was to evaluate the 
effectiveness of the ATAK as a tactical-level SA and C2 tool by testing its ability to 
aggregate, display, and share critical information across a network that is similar to the data 
flow and necessary to share critical information in a CWMD/CBRN environment. This 
experiment provided us with familiarization and a baseline for ATAK at the tactical level 
before attempting to expand its role as an operational-level C4I system. 
2. Introduction 
To test the tactical utility of the ATAK and wireless mesh networks (WMN), we 
traveled to the U.S. Air Force’s Weapons School at Nellis AFB.64 To validate the use of 
ATAK as a tactical-level SA tool as well as enhance the realism and training value of the 
Weapons School Weapons Instructor Course (WIC), we established a WMN including 
internet gateways (IGW) and several ATAK mesh client nodes. We were able to observe 
the application of the ATAK in a, live-fire, fire support coordination exercise. This test 
supported the following research questions:  
• How can the expansion of the TAK concept to the joint operational level 
in the form of a JOCTAK improve the collective planning, mission 
command, and digital collaboration between JIIM partners?  
                                                 
64 “United States Air Force Weapons School,” Nellis Air Force Base, accessed April 4, 2018, 
http://www.nellis.af.mil/About/Fact-Sheets/Display/Article/284156/united-states-air-force-weapons-
school/. “The U.S. Air Force Weapons School trains tactical experts and leaders to control and exploit air, 
space, and cyber on behalf of the Joint Force. It also provides academic and advisory support to numerous 
units, enhancing air combat training for thousands of service members from the U.S. Department of 
Defense and allied services each year. Additionally, it provides a controlled learning environment and 
knowledge trust for best practices in air, space, and cyber combat techniques.” 
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• What are the necessary components and designs for the JOCTAK SA 
templates and planning knowledge management in a MDB environment? 
3. Context/Background 
Currently, Joint Terminal Attack Controller (JTAC) students and instructors at the 
USAF WIC use the ATAK as a digital map on a mobile ad hoc network (MANET). JTAC 
students and cadre communicate using voice over line of sight (LOS) and SATCOM radios 
to fellow teams, aircraft, and the JOC at Nellis AFB. During the experiment, there was no 
capability for communication via the ATAK with the aircraft that were dropping live 
ordnance. Their standard practice with the ATAK is to load imagery and grid reference 
graphics (GRG), plot the locations and range rings of known or suspected enemy air 
defense artillery (ADA) and defensive weapons systems, as well as friendly positions and 
graphics by hand prior to mission execution.65  
If operating with a ground force, JTACs are able to use the ATAK through a local 
WMN using Harris PRC 152 radios and the Harris ANW2 protocol but do not routinely 
train to do this. Similarly, JTACs do not train to use their radios in a WMN configuration 
connected to an IGW to access the internet or connect to a remote server. JTAC teams also 
do not have the ability to share their personal location indicator (PLI) data with the JOC at 
Nellis AFB through an IGW.66 
4. Method 
We tracked the operations from a JOC established at the Nellis AFB garrison (see 
Figure 3). The team also collected diagnostics and data transmission information during 
four day and night missions. Additionally, each member of our team served as a ground 
force commander (GFC), adding realism to the training scenario for the participating 
Weapons School students. In real time, students were required to coordinate with a research 
team member acting as the GFC to call in air support and fire missions during each interval. 
Research team members serving as GFCs used the ATAK and the WMN to battle track 
                                                 
65 Weapons School Operations Officer, email message to authors, September 10, 2017. 
66 Weapons School Operations Officer. 
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both friendly and enemy positions as well as coordinate through the students for 
appropriate utilization of air support and ground-based fires.  
 
Figure 3. Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) and WIC students at 
Nellis AFB live fire range.  
The Primary, Alternate, Contingency, and Emergency (PACE) communications 
architectures established was: 
• Primary communications structure (P): ATAK—4G/LTE; Antenna: 
international maritime satellite (INMARSAT) 
• Alternate communications structure (A): ATAK—MPU-4; Antenna: 
INMARSAT 
• Contingency communications structure (C): ATAK—Harris PRC 152 
connected to a BGAN (using current SOF inventory) 
• Emergency communications structure (E): “Extend the mesh network” 
ATAK—MPU-4 WMN/ GoTenna/Beartooth—117G radio at JOC 
In a real-world operation, a similar PACE plan would enhance the digital 
collaboration of all elements involved as well as the operator’s effectiveness by giving 
them the capability to use the ATAK through a local WMN using (P) 4G/LTE Antenna, or 
MPU-4/ MPU-5 through INMARSAT (A), Harris PRC 152 radios and the Harris ANW2 
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protocol through BGAN (C), and emergency communications structure “extend the mesh” 
with a combination of MPU-4/ GoTenna/ Beartooth through the 117G at JOC (E). 
5. Observations 
By incorporating the ATAK into the JTAC training scenarios, we were able to 
battle track both friendly and enemy positions with great accuracy. The improved SA 
derived from the ability to visualize enemy and friendly positions in the ATAK as opposed 
to relying on LOS communications from the tactical elements greatly improved the 
common operating picture of the JOC. JTAC’s also gained increased efficiency in the 
development of their CAS 9-line request sequence by being able to instantaneously identify 
all friendly positions in the ATAK. Depending on the location, the mobile broadband 4G 
LTE connection was able to facilitate the data throughput required for the operation of the 
ATAK. We also tested the use of the WMN. On the second day of testing at a more austere 
location, we were unable to get adequate cellular connectivity and utilized the alternate 
communications structure. The INMARSAT used in conjunction with the MPU-4 WMN 
was able to handle the bandwidth requirements of the ATAK network. We team capitalized 
on the austere location to use the contingency communications structure and observed no 
issues with the BGAN device.  
6. Analysis 
Based on the results, we assess that: 
1. The architecture of this testbed can serve as a model for increasing the 
connectivity of SOF teams currently using ATAKs across the various 
combatant command areas of responsibility. Additional research will need 
to be conducted to identify effective means of communicating new TAK 
applications, capabilities, limitations, and usage scenarios for each mission 
set.  
2. The WMN architecture and internet access, when introduced to this 
environment, provides new capabilities to the operators on the ground and 
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their higher HQ. Through the incorporation of wireless mesh connectivity, 
the ATAK becomes more than a digital map. 
3. The ATAK system, when used in an MDB environment can improve the 
effectiveness of operations at both the tactical and operational levels. By 
aggregating and sharing movements and locations of both friendly and 
enemy positions, operators on the ground can utilize the ATAK to 
improve SA not only for tactical commanders but also for command teams 
and JOCs at higher levels.  
4. The existing ATAK infrastructure, when enhanced with the WMN 
provided by the MPU 4/5 radios and the connectivity of an IGW, would 
allow operators on the ground to digitally collaborate with aircraft 
dropping live ordnance in a safer manner. This could give the aircraft 
crews an extra safety check to de-conflict friendly and enemy positions 
and lessen the chance that operators on the ground or pilots in the air 
would either pass or receive incorrect grid coordinates for lethal 
munitions. 
B. TEST II: JIFX I, FEBRUARY 2018 
1. Experiment Design Considerations 
The February 2018 Joint Interagency Field Experimentation Program (JIFX) effort 
with the ATAK built on the progress made at Nellis AFB and continued collaboration 
between different joint partners and the ATAK software developers as needed, to 
implement necessary changes. Continued collaboration with software developers is 
extremely important as the development of ATAK plug-ins is a continuing process that 
presents its own challenges. Because plug-ins are not always co-developed for use on both 
ATAK and WinTAK, there are often gaps in intercompatibility and the ability to display 
plug-in specific data. Additionally, because the ATAK core program is updated every 120 
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days, plug-ins do not always maintain functionality across all versions of the ATAK 
itself.67 
Having validated the efficacy of the basic ATAK functionality, The NPS team 
determined that additional experimentation should expand the proven capability by testing 
sensor integration and the use of sensors in the CWMD environment. It is necessary to 
determine how effectively current CBRN plug-ins and sensors currently function with the 
ATAK at the tactical level, before expanding to an operational level C4I infrastructure.  
2. Introduction 
In February 2018, the team traveled to the California National Guard’s Camp 
Roberts to conduct the next phase of field experimentation with the ATAK during the 
quarterly Joint Interagency Field Experimentation Program (JIFX).68 The facilities at 
Camp Roberts were able to enhance the realism of the experiment by offering several 
different military training areas, specifically the Combined Arms Combat Training Facility 
(CACTF). This allowed the simulation of operations in an urban environment. The team 
tested several radiological sensors, including one prototype and one proprietary ATAK 
CBRN plug-in, developed by the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA).69 The plug-
                                                 
67 Sterling, “TAK LSE Brief”; Operators often are not aware of newly developed sensor applications 
within the TAK suite. Further, applications often are not cross-platform compatible. For example, 
applications are not developed for both ATAK and WinTAK platforms concurrently; most applications are 
developed for ATAK before being developed for WinTAK. 
68 According to the sponsor’s webpage, the JIFX program “is an NPS effort that began in 2012 under 
the sponsorship of the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Department of Homeland Security.” NPS 
participates in quarterly JIFX events at NPS-owned facilities on McMillan Airfield at Camp Roberts. 
Similarly, JIFX also “provides an experimentation resource for the Unified Combatant Commands 
(COCOMs) and other federal agencies. Additionally, local, state, international emergency management, 
disaster response, and humanitarian assistance organizations participate in JIFX on a regular basis.” This 
experimentation environment is organized in a manner that is austere by nature so that it mimics deployed 
conditions as close as possible. Additionally, JIFX brings together NPS student researchers, as well as 
many different elements from the DoD, representatives from the different COCOMs, and private industry 
companies in a collaborative testing environment that is beneficial to all parties involved. In this unique 
environment, NPS students can meet and discuss their research with different entities as well as receive 
recommendations from other participating experimenters/testers that can enhance the student’s research or 
assist it by providing additional network infrastructure. “What Is JIFX?,” Naval Postgraduate School,” 
accessed August 6, 2018, https://my.nps.edu/web/fx/what-is-jifx-. 
69 At the time of testing, both ATAK and the plug-in were version 3.6. Both have since received 
additional updates and continue to be developed and improved. 
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in and a prototype sensor developed by Draper Labs, the HRM replacement sensor, were 
both provided for testing.  
Because we paired with the NPS Center for Network Innovation and 
Experimentation (CENETIX) Laboratory, the experiment had multiple goals. The 
CENETIX team was attempting to determine the most efficient way to utilize various 
sensors and drones to shorten the detection, location, and identification (DLI) sequence of 
a radiological source during a wide area search (WAS).70 We were interested in evaluating 
the capability of the ATAK paired with the provided plug-in to integrate and transmit data 
from connected sensors at the tactical level to the operational level JOC. This experiment 
supported the following research questions:  
• How can the expansion of the TAK concept to the joint operational level 
in the form of a JOCTAK improve the collective planning, mission 
command, and digital collaboration between JIIM partners? 
• How can CWMD sensors and the TAK plug-ins improve the RAA 
capability among operators, technical specialists, and mission command 
during a WMD scenario? 
• What are the necessary CWMD sensor components and TAK plug-in 
software designs for meeting future JIIM mission sets? 
3. Method 
We devised a three-part approach. First, to perform an initial detection of the 
presence of radiological material; second, to locate the detected source; and finally, to 
identify the radioactive isotope present and determine if it required follow-on action or not. 
For the first step, we used RAA techniques with a TOC directing tactical units, and an 
advise cell was available for subject matter expertise via RAA directly to the tactical-level 
                                                 
70 For the purposes of this experiment, WAS is defined as an urban area approximately the size and 
density of a mall, stadium, city block, or other urban structure that is approximately 200 meters squared, 
where multiple simultaneous detections from multiple sensors and operators are possible. 
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operators. The TOC coordinated the detection, location, and identification efforts, and the 
advise cell assisted in adjudication once a source was detected.  
During this experiment, NPS students were augmented by multiple DOD entities 
as well as several private industry participants. Government agency participation included 
DTRA, Naval Special Warfare (NSW), California Army National Guard (CAARNG) 95th 
Civil Support Team (CST), CAARNG 9th CST, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory 
(LLNL) Radiological Assistance Program (RAP) Team 7, Lawrence Berkeley National 
Laboratory (LBNL) Research Team, the Camp Roberts base and flight operations support 
(NPS). Additionally, private industry participation included assistance from Terratracker 
and Radmet. 
With such a large group of different DOD and industry participants collaborating, 
we had a plethora of sensors at their disposal (see Figure 4). This allowed the team to test 
plug-in capabilities on multiple sensors and see how those sensors delivered information 
through the ATAK to the operators on the ground and the TOC where the collection of data 
could be managed and interpreted. 
 
Figure 4. JIFX I platforms 
The following unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) and unmanned ground vehicles 




• Two mid-size Matrice-600 Pro UAVs (Figure 5) 
 
Figure 5. Matrice 600 Pro71  
• Two miniature UAVs, Shield AI and “Inspire” Quadrotor systems (Figure 
6) 
 
Figure 6. Shield AI UAV72  
 
                                                 
71 Source: “Matrice 600 Pro,” DJI, accessed August 24, 2018, https://store.dji.com/product/matrice-
600-pro. 
72 Source: “Products: Artificially Intelligent ISR Asset for Ground Forces,” Shield AI, accessed 
August 24, 2018, https://www.shield.ai/products/. 
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• NPS robotic mobility platform (RMP) 400 unmanned ground vehicles 
(UGV) (Figure 7) 
 
Figure 7. Segway RMP 40073 
• Two TALON systems (Figure 8) 
 
Figure 8. TALON tracked military robot74 
                                                 
73 Source: “Segway RMP 400,” Segway, accessed August 24, 2018, https://msu.edu/~luckie/segway/
rmp/rmp.html. 
74 Source: “TALON Tracked Military Robot,” Army Technology (blog), accessed August 24, 2018, 
https://www.army-technology.com/projects/talon-tracked-military-robot/. 
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• The following detectors and sensors were used during this experiment: 
sub-micron multi-beam/LIDAR/ localization and mapping platform 
(LAMP) sensor (LBNL) (Figure 9) 
The LAMP sensor has the ability to identify sources and create 3-D models 
of radiological environments in real time. Additionally, LAMP overlays the 
3-D model with a heat map showing the specific section of the building or 
structure of interest.75 
 
Figure 9. Localization and mapping platform76 





                                                 
75 “Localization and Mapping Platform 2.0 2017–114,” Intellectual Property Office, June 15, 2018, 
https://ipo.lbl.gov/lbnl2017-114/. 
76 Adapted from Intellectual Property Office. 
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• One adaptable radiation aerial monitor (ARAM) sensor (UAV-UGV based 
LLNL-Terratracker) (Figure 10) 
 
Figure 10. Scintillation sensors for ARAM software.77  
• Large 4x4x16” NAI gamma detector (DTRA/NPS) (Figure 11) 
 
Figure 11. NAI gamma detector78  
                                                 
77 “Large Volume Scintillation Counter| Berkeley Nucleonics,” Berkeley Nucleonics, accessed August 
24, 2018, https://www.berkeleynucleonics.com/large-volume-scintillation-counter. 
78 Source: “4 Inch x 4 Inch x 16 Inch NaI(Tl) Scintillation Detector, Energy Resolution: 
≤8.5%@662keV(Cs-137),” OST Photonics, accessed August 24, 2018, https://www.ost-photonics.com/
product/4%e2%80%b3x4%e2%80%b3x16%e2%80%b3-naitl-scintillation-detector/. 
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• identiFINDER R-400 (NPS) (Figure 12) 
 
Figure 12. identiFINDER R40079 
Each platform was fitted with a specific radiological/nuclear (R/N) sensor (based 
on payload capability) and was tested to determine the time required to DLI a radiological 
source. For each test iteration, a small radiological source was hidden, and various sensors 
(attached to a specific unmanned platform) were employed to complete the three separate 
portions of the experiment. Using the ATAK architecture, our goal was to first perform an 
initial detection of the presence of radiological material, without a locational component; 
second, to locate the detected source; and finally, to identify the radioactive isotope present 
and determine if it required follow-on action or not. We conducted multiple iterations using 
the DLI model with the various sensors equipped on the different unmanned platforms 
available. After several iterations, the most efficient WAS sequence was established:  
 
Step 1: Detect (D), by searching the outermost perimeter by driving large 
adaptable radiation aerial monitor (ARAM) sensors and a UGV-based small 
(ARAM) sensor. 
Step 2: Locate (L) by flying a mid-size Matrice-600 UAV with the LIDAR-
LAMP sensor (Figure 13). 
                                                 
79 Source: “IdentiFINDER R400 All-Purpose Radionuclide Identification Device,” FLIR Systems, 
accessed August 26, 2018, https://www.flir.com/products/identifinder-r400/. 
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Figure 13. LAMP LIDAR 3D heatmap  
Step 3: Build an internal mapping of the structure utilizing Shield AI (Figure 14).  
 
Figure 14. Shield AI 2D LIDAR mapping 
Step 4: Identify (I) via flights by “Inspire” UAV, equipped with the miniature 
HRM sensor.  
Step 5: Secondary identification and the establishment of a visual feed on the 
source by two simultaneously searching Talon stair-climbing UGVs equipped 
with identiFINDER 2 sensors 
Note: This detect, locate, and identify sequence took approximately 1 hour and 25 
minutes from the time we initiated the scenario until the radiological source was 
identified as a specific isotope.80  
                                                 




Using the TAK network and CBRN plug-in we were able to perform all of these 
functions using a single application. The plug-in integrated multiple sensors and broadcast 
the data across the network. The sensor data is shown as a breadcrumb trail or heat map of 
sensor activity above a specified detection threshold. This allowed an operator or UAV to 
walk or fly a set route and see where readings increased or decreased along that route, what 
isotopes were detected, and the percentage of accuracy for assessed isotope identification. 
Furthermore, the ATAK CBRN combination allowed that information to be shared 
across the ATAK network to anyone else who has the application, allowing for 
coordination of multiple sensors and agents from the JOC. The CBRN plug-in also has the 
capability for another user to control the settings of the sensor remotely. This allowed a 
remote operator to change sensor settings, thresholds, etc. This capability could be used 
not only on a UAV bearing a remote sensor but also potentially on undercover agent or 
untrained units that are not in a position to manually monitor and change sensor or 
application settings.  
In the course of the experiment, we noted that the ATAK CBRN plug-in was useful 
when the ATAK network was functioning as designed. It worked well with the sensor 
provided by DTRA (HRM replacement) and allowed detection of radiological sources as 
well as isotope identification directly from the ATAK phone. Additionally, the plug-in 
supported multiple sensors and allowed remote access to the sensor data from another 
ATAK device as designed. This information could also be viewed from the TOC on an 
ATAK-CBRN-equipped phone as well as by the advise cell SME to confirm the need for 
further action or dismiss a false reading (in the event of the sensor detecting a false source 
such as thoriated tungsten welding rods).  
The primary problem noted during testing was a slow refresh rate on the data sent 
to the ATAKs from the HRM replacement sensor. When the sensor was either mounted to 
an unmanned system or handheld, the spike in detection would appear on the ATAK phone 
after the sensor had already passed the area where the source was located if moving at a 
moderate pace. This made using the sensor for the location of the source difficult on the 
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heat map display, as the lag between detection and the reported location on the phone’s 
GPS did not always synchronize correctly. The authors’ conversation with Tom McKnight 
indicated that newer versions of the sensor were in development at the time of testing and 
that they would have a faster refresh rate as well as the possibility to connect to a phone 
via a hardwired USB cable instead of relying only on Bluetooth connectivity.81  
From a C2 standpoint, the primary deficiency was the lack of the WinTAK 
integration for the plug-in. As mentioned earlier, plug-ins developed for the ATAK do not 
always function correctly with the WinTAK, and it is impractical to display an ATAK 
screen on a monitor and use it in the TOC. This made coordination of units by the TOC 
and advice from the SME more difficult, as they were limited to using a phone-sized screen.  
The communications infrastructure between the experiments at Nellis WIC and 
JIFX I differed due to the nature and objectives of each experiment. During the First 
experiment, the alternate architecture was used (WMN utilizing MPU 4/5). This was not 
copied during the second experiment. Because of this, network connectivity became a 
limiting factor as the team’s physical location at Camp Roberts in the CACTF provided 
challenges to network connectivity using the local wireless node provided onsite and 
cellular data connectivity. This oversight was remedied by collocating the TOC and advise 
cell at the CACTF with the tactical search element, allowing for a local area network to be 
used.  
5. Analysis 
From an integration perspective, the HRM replacement/ATAK combination is 
better suited for a person to carry as opposed to having it positioned on a UAV. The 
Bluetooth connection required for the sensor is easily disrupted by the radio-frequency 
interference caused by flying the UAV. Because of the disruption, the operator must 
maintain close proximity to stay connected while flying. In a test with no UAV, where the 
ATAK phone and sensor were carried by a student researcher, the connection was 
maintained out to approximately 100 ft. However, when tested with the UAV, the ATAK 
                                                 
81 Personal communication with Tom McKnight, DRAPER Labs, March 1 2018.  
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phone needed to stay within about 1 ft of the sensor or it lost connectivity as soon as the 
UAV launched. While it is possible to remotely monitor the sensor via the ATAK network, 
the sensor requires an embedded communications capability. The phone was used as a field 
expedient connectivity solution, something that is impractical in a hostile environment. 
Additionally, it would be impractical to fly the phone, sensor, and radio for maintaining 
network connectivity on most small platforms due to weight restrictions. Additional 
development of the UAV payload-carrying capability (appropriate attachments for the 
sensors) needs to be developed before follow-on testing and eventual fielding to SOF units. 
The lack of WinTAK integration is a significant issue for further development of 
the JOCTAK. While the Android platform provides a good solution for the field, it is 
impractical to run everything in the JOC from an Android phone or through an emulator. 
The NPS team identified the short flight times (less than 30 minutes) of small UAVs used 
as a major impediment to adoption of a similar drone detection capability by forward-
operating units. Additionally, the inability to use radiation sensors from a large standoff 
distance for initial detector further complicates the use of UAVs by prohibiting the 
adoption of larger, high-altitude platforms with increased loiter times. 
C. TEST III: JIFX II, AUGUST 2018 
1. Experiment Design Considerations 
For the August 2018 experiment, we determined that further testing of sensor 
integration into the CBRN plug-in and remote monitoring of sensors from the TOC or JOC 
needed to be performed. Further evaluation of the current capabilities of the TAK as a 
CWMD C4I system would determine what changes and improvements the JOCTAK would 
require over the current TAK system. This testing included the pairing of multiple sensors 
to a single ATAK device as well as monitoring multiple phones with paired sensors from 
the JOC. Additionally, it was determined that testing a larger variety of sensors would be 
desirable as many of the sensors available were not capable of direct connection to the 
CBRN plug-in, either because they had no external connectivity or they did not 
communicate using the DTRA N42 file format required by the plug-in.  
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2. Introduction 
In August 2018, we returned to the California National Guard’s Camp Roberts to 
conduct the final phase of field experimentation with the ATAK and CWMD sensor 
integration. The team once again paired up with NPS’s CENETIX Research Center for 
continued use of both their equipment and expertise with wireless mesh networks. The 
purpose of JIFX II was to build on the testing conducted at JIFX I in February 2018, which 
focused on a single sensor integrated with a single device at the tactical level. During JIFX 
II we expanded on the previous testing by attempting to determine the limits of sensor 
integration into the ATAK architecture. First, for this experiment, we tested the CBRN 
plug-in’s ability to integrate multiple sensors per device (ATAK phone) as well as the 
overall integration of each specific sensor. Second, the team attempted to determine the 
sensors that worked well with the ATAK and the ones that did not. 
The experiment attempted to replicate multiple ground elements working in concert 
at different locations using multiple radiological detection devices and to test whether the 
TAK infrastructure along with the CBRN plug-in would support numerous devices 
simultaneously. Testing further advanced our goal of utilizing the TAK network to address 
the lack of an operational level JTF mission command system that can work as an 
aggregation tool to combine data feeds from multiple tactical elements and sensors in a 
single system. As U.S. and partner nation forces conduct CWMD operations, they must 
have the capability to share information and alerts between tactical unit members and a 
higher headquarters. Additionally, they need to maintain command, control, and shared SA 
during operations. This experiment supported the following research questions: 
• How can the expansion of the TAK concept to the joint operational level 
in the form of a JOCTAK improve the collective planning, mission 
command, and digital collaboration between JIIM partners? 
• What are the necessary components and designs for a JOCTAK SA 
templates and planning knowledge management in an MDB environment? 
• What are the necessary CWMD sensor components and TAK plug-in 
software designs for meeting future JIIM mission sets? 
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3. Method 
Using the JIFX training environment and a collaborative approach, we received 
technical assistance from two different elements: the California Army National Guard’s 
95th CST and LLNL. The 95th CST sent CBRN SMEs to assist in the use of the various 
sensors tested.82  
In addition to the SMEs, the 95th CST also provided technical advice and multiple 
sensors to conduct CBRN plug-in integration training. LLNL provided a representative that 
aided by supplying a recently developed Radiation Field Training Simulator (RaFTS) that 
“provides realistic radiation detection training by directly transmitting simulate radiation 
readings into the analog amplifier of real detectors.”83 The system in Figure 15 is shown 
using the ARAM.  
 
Figure 15. LLNL RaFTS system84 
Because the RaFTS replicates live radioactive sources directly to the sensor, it 
allowed the NPS team a secondary means of testing the CBRN plug-in’s capability and 
                                                 
82 “California Civil Support Team Enhances Civilian Partnerships,” National Guard, accessed August 
16, 2018, http://www.nationalguard.mil/News/Article/576048/california-civil-support-team-enhances-
civilian-partnerships-through-training/. The 95th CST is an active duty guard unit with the primary mission 
of supporting civil authorities at the direction of the governor. 
83 “Ultra-Realistic Radiation Detection Training without Using Radioactive Materials,” Lawrence 
Livermore National Laboratory, January 14, 2015, https://www.llnl.gov/news/ultra-realistic-radiation-
detection-training-without-using-radioactive-materials. 
84 Source: Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. 
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integration into the ATAK.85 Additionally, we tested both the military and civilian 
(MIL/CIV) variants of the CBRN plug-in across all phases of experimentation to determine 
cross-compatibility for CIV-MIL use.  
We devised a three-step approach to test sensor integration and the overall ATAK 
compatibility.  
Step I consisted of testing the CBRN plug-in capability by pairing a single sensor 
to a single ATAK device. Utilizing the WMN functionality of the MPU-4 radios and a 
repeater, the team tested various sensor integration with the ATAK using the CBRN plug-
in provided by DTRA.  
Sensors used/tested:  
• Three Nucsafe Man-Portable Radiation Detection Systems (MPDS) 
(Figure 16). The NPS team received two Nucsafe Guardian Defender 
MPDS backpacks from the 95th CST, and a third Nucsafe Guardian 
Predator MPDS backpack was provided by DTRA. In both cases, the 
MPDS consists of multiple components that allow it to be used in a low 
profile, low visibility format. It is capable of detecting gamma-ray and 
neutron emissions depending upon configuration. Significant to the use of 
the MPDS is its ability to also identify the source after location.86 
                                                 
85 “Ultra-Realistic Radiation Detection Training without Using Radioactive Materials,” Lawrence 
Livermore National Laboratory, January 14, 2015, https://www.llnl.gov/news/ultra-realistic-radiation-
detection-training-without-using-radioactive-materials. 




Figure 16. Nucsafe MPDS.87  
• One handheld identiFINDER R400 and one identiFINDER II detection 
systems (Figure 17). As before, the models varied slightly, but the 
functionality and capability of the actual sensors are relatively similar. The 
identiFINDER series of sensors are radioisotope identification devices 
(RIID) capable of detecting gamma and neutron sources as well as identify 
the source with a high degree of certainty once it is located.88 
                                                 
87 Adapted from EPE. 




Figure 17. identiFINDER II detection system.89 
• Two handheld ORTEC Micro Detective devices (Figure 18). An ORTEC 
Microdetective HX was provided by the 95th CST, and an ORTEC 
EX100R was provided by DTRA. As with the other two types of sensors, 
the two ORTEC systems varied slightly, but capability and overall 
functionality remained the same. The ORTEC devices are capable of 
accurate nuclide identification based on both gamma and neutron 
detection. This device, like the others tested, is capable of identifying the 
source after detection has occurred.90 
 
                                                 
89 All Safe Industries. 
90 “Micro-Detective Ultra light, Portable Hand Held Radioisotope Identifier,” ORTEC, accessed 




Figure 18. ORTEC Micro Detective HX detection device91 
Step II testing connected multiple sensors to a single device (ATAK phone). This 
allowed a remote user at the JOC/operational level to view data from multiple sensors 
through the ATAK network.  
Step III increased the number of sensors and devices on the ATAK network. The 
purpose was to test the ATAK’s ability to aggregate both multiple sensors connected to a 
single ATAK device via the CBRN plug-in as well as multiple ATAK devices each 
connected to more than one sensor. This also tested the network’s ability to handle a larger 
amount of data being sent from the tactical level to the JOC for remote viewing and better 
SA at the operational level.  
4. Observations 
The Nucsafe MPDS was the only Sensor that would effectively connect to the 
ATAK using the CBRN plug-in and operate as desired.  
Step I: For single sensor-single device testing, the Nucsafe backpacks were used 
as they performed best with the plug-in. During the testing, the students were able to view 
data transmitted from the sensor on the local ATAK device; as well as view data remotely 
at the JOC. Students were also able to pass text communications and pictures across the 
                                                 
91 “Micro-Detective Ultra Light Portable RIID | RUGGED RIID | AMETEK ORTEC,” accessed 
August 16, 2018, https://www.ortec-online.com/products/nuclear-security-and-safeguards/hand-held-
radioisotope-identifiers-riids/micro-detective. 
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network. A split view of the ATAK running the CBRN plug-in and a screenshot of students 
reading measurements from the Nucsafe backpack wrist monitor is shown in Figure 19.  
 
Figure 19. ATAK R/N plug-in (left) and Nucsafe wrist monitor (right)  
Step I was successful. It allowed the personnel at the tactical level to integrate 
sensor data into the TAK network and remote viewing at the JOC. Additionally, a student 
located at the JOC was able to remotely initiate a sample collection and perform isotope 




Figure 20. Remote viewing of sensor data (from JOC) connected to the 
ATAK network via R/N plug-in 
Step II: In contrast to the use of the CBRN plug-in paired with the HRM 
replacement sensor used in the first JIFX experiment we found it difficult to operate with 
the wider variety of sensors available for JIFX II. While the HRM replacement sensor 
provided by Draper for the first experiment was specifically designed to work with the 
CBRN plug-in, the sensors used in JIFX II were not. Of the sensors available, it only 
functioned adequately on the Nucsafe MPDS. Following is a breakdown of all sensors and 
their specific configurations with the CBRN plug-in, the ATAK devices, and the MPU-4 
radios as well as the issues that the NPS team discovered with the assistance from the 95th 
CST.  
a. Guardian Defender Nucsafe MPDS 
As per the CBRN plug-in instructions, the MPDS was connected to the MPU-4 
radios via a cat5 ethernet connection and functioned in that configuration. Other possible 
ways to fix wireless connectivity issues included using the paired Android device with 
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network connectivity (SIM card) or hard lining/wiring it using a bridging device to connect 
to the MPU-4s.92 
Additionally, the MPDS sensors had to be adjusted for a non-standard network 
configuration prior to use with the wireless mesh network setup by CENETIX. The 95th 
CST was able to perform the necessary changes. Once the sensors were configured and 
connected to the MPU-4 radios via Ethernet connections, the ATAK phones were then 
wirelessly connected to the same MPU-4 as MPDS. Within the ATAK application plug-in, 
the Internet Protocol (IP) address of the MPDS sensor was entered, and the phone was then 
capable of connecting to the sensor and had full control of the backpack. Once configured 
correctly the MPDS worked as intended with the CBRN plug-in. 
b. Nucsafe Guardian Predator MPDS  
This sensor, loaned to the NPS team from DTRA, was an older model than the 
sensors provided by the 95th CST. It came with the required software but was incompatible 
with the software provided by the 95th CST MPDSs. Because of the differences in model 
types and resulting software issues, we were unable to change the IP address or configure 
the domain/range in order to connect this sensor to the MPU-4 radios or the ATAK phones.  
c. identiFINDER R400 and identiFINDER 2 
The identiFINDER series of sensors were some of the more challenging to use with 
the CBRN plug-in. The sensors themselves are very capable and lightweight, easy to read, 
and user-friendly. However, they were the only two sensors that had no preconfigured 
profile for connection to the CBRN plug-in. The NPS team attempted to connect to the 
sensors as a generic DTRA N42 and DTRA N42 commandable device using the 
identiFINDER and Samsung phones Bluetooth connection. Despite being able to pair the 
sensor and phones via Bluetooth, the connection was not successful with the ATAK 
application. The connection was also attempted using the SRD sensor option in the plug-
in to the mac address of the identiFINDER, but no connection was established. Also noted 
was the identiFINDER’s incompatibility with Windows 10. Using the devices internal 
                                                 
92 Draper Labs, email message to authors, May 31, 2018. 
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USB port connected to a Windows 10 computer multiple attempts were made to program 
the devices network settings to no avail. The devices software settings were finally 
accessed from a Windows 7 PC but still unable to be connected to the ATAK application.  
d. ORTEC Microdetective HX and ORTEC EX100R 
There was a preconfigured connection profile within the CBRN plug-in for the 
ORTEC sensors. Both sensors were able to utilize their respective built-in PDA devices, 
with a Windows CE operating system, to connect to the Wi-Fi hotspot generated by an 
MPU-4 radio. Once established the connection was unstable and would drop periodically. 
We attempted troubleshooting by verifying that the IP address of the ORTEC sensors was 
changed according to the instructions within the ATAK CBRN application as well as the 
Detective EX-application within the Windows CE device, which is part of the ORTEC 
sensor itself. This was eventually determined to be a hardware fault in the MPU-4 radio 
used as a Wi-Fi connection point for the sensors. Once corrected, both devices were 
eventually connected to the MPU-4 radios and able to maintain stable connections.  
After a connection to the MPU-4 was established with the ORTEC, an ATAK 
device was connected to the same MPU-4, and a pairing was established with the sensor 
using the preconfigured option in the CBRN plug-in. Once connected, the functionality of 
the sensors was minimal. They could be viewed in the ATAK but were not commandable. 
Any attempt to initiate a remote collection or view past readings caused the CBRN plug-
in to crash or present an error message. Also, after initiating a collection locally on the 
device, it was not viewable on the connected ATAK phone even though the data was 
present and visible from the sensor. 
Step III: Step III was initially planned as the final progression in the sequence of 
increasing the number of sensors and devices on the TAK network. It was intended to test 
the TAK networks ability to aggregate data from multiple ATAK phones and associated 
sensors with the CBRN plug-in. However, due to the aforementioned sensor integration 
issues, it was not possible to complete Phase III as designed because the only sensors that 
would properly connect to the CBRN plug-in were the Nucsafe Guardian Defender MPDS 
backpacks. Therefore, the research team decided to capitalize on time available and 
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integrate a newly developed ATAK compatible application named Virtual Radiation 
Training through Ubiety System (VIRTUS) (see Figure 21) provided by DTRA. This 
allowed the us to continue testing the ATAK sensor integration and communication 
between devices across the TAK network. 
 
Figure 21. VIRTUS ATAK plug-in93 
VIRTUS was created by DTRA to provide realistic training in the absence of actual 
radiological sources and detectors. VIRTUS is a suite of Android apps that run on Android 
phones and tablets.94 While it is similar to the simulated sources created by the RaFTS 
system, the VIRTUS software simulates both the source and sensor, whereas RaFTS 
provides a simulated input to an existing sensor. A simulated source being placed on the 
map by a student using VIRTUS at the CACTF training site is shown in Figure 22.  
                                                 
93 Source: “VIRTUS,” Defense Threat Reduction Agency, accessed August 13, 2018, 
http://www.dtra.mil/Mission/WMD-Training-and-Education/VIRTUS/. 
94 Defense Threat Reduction Agency. 
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Figure 22. VIRTUS application placing simulated source next to students 
at CACTF training site.  
We configured the VIRTUS application in the ATAK devices while utilizing the 
existing WMN provided by the MPU-4 radios and was able to execute a scenario using 
simulated sources with simulated sensors successfully. The JOC was able to successfully 
track the location on the source by remotely monitoring the ATAK devices and their 
associated simulated sensor. The location of the ATAK devices and the simulated sensors 
is shown in Figure 23. Additionally, the team used a second ATAK device to simulate a 
second sensor, demonstrating the capability to share two virtual sensor feeds across the 
ATAK network.  
 
Figure 23. VIRTUS simulated sensor tracking.  
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5. Analysis 
Despite the issues experienced during this round of experimentation, there were 
valuable findings.  
1. The inter-compatibility between the military and civilian variants of the 
ATAK and their respective CBRN plug-ins works very well, with sensors 
that are not supported in the ATAK civilian variant still visible if 
connected to the military variant and shared on the network. This would 
allow easy integration between U.S. military forces and civilian or partner 
nation services that do not have access to the ATAK military variant due 
to international trade and arms regulations.  
2. Despite the fact that there are options for integration of multiple sensors 
into the plug-in, actual compatibility and function are very limited in 
certain cases.  
3. When paired with a sensor that functions as expected, the ATAK in 
combination with the CBRN plug-in provides the necessary information 
and sensor data for JOC-level decision making and SME advising of 
CBRN/CWMD operations. 
4. The ATAK RAA framework is capable of being repurposed for unilateral 
advising by a SME providing analysis to a tactical level unit remotely in 
near real time. 
D. CONCLUSION OF EXPERIMENTATION 
There is also an immediate need to revamp the existing sensor integration into the 
ATAK via the CBRN plug-in application. This is mainly a coding and software 
development issue that must to be addressed for proper functionality. Additionally, the lack 
of backwards compatibility of ATAK versions and plug-ins continues to hamper effective 
use. Operators are unable to use the most recent build for fear of plug-in incompatibility. 
This could limit the use of other mission essential plug-ins that may have become available 
with new ATAK builds.  
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Currently, the envisioned version of the JOCTAK is still in the beginning stages of 
development. One of the primary issues in our testing was the lack of WinTAK or 
WebTAK integration, which required the use of Android devices instead of Windows-
based PCs in the JOC. Additionally, at the tactical level, the difficulty pairing the ATAK 
devices with the sensors as designed limited the usefulness of the CBRN plug-in. Despite 
the number of sensors listed as compatible within the CBRN plug-in, only one prototype 
and two production sensors proved to be fully functional during our experimentation. 
Finally, unrelated to the TAK program itself, the most significant overall problem resulted 
from network connectivity issues due to communication disruption.  
1. Future Research Areas 
Key items for future research and the incorporation of JIIM Partners:  
• Identifying systems and sensors used by JIIM partners 
• Integrating ATAK in an RAA/CWMD with JIIM partner’s equipment  
• Identifying their data format standards and compatibilities issues with the 
ATAK 
• Moving forward with U.S. systems’ integration, researching and 
identifying how to develop our own systems and sensors to enhance JIIM 
compatibility  
We have multiple mission command systems and CBRN sensors, but none of them 
are unified into a reliable system that truly fits the mission requirements and needs.  
There needs to be an overhaul or a more concerted effort to ensure cross-platform 
integration: SYSTEMATIC to TAK, MFK to ATAK/JOCTAK. Based on the field 
experiments, the following are proposed future research focus areas:  
• Determine the feasibility of using ATAK plug-ins with WinTAK, 
potentially using a software redesign or emulator.  
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• CBRN application, programmers need to perform a more robust 
verification of compatibility with desired sensor types to include different 
software and hardware versions.  
• Determine the feasibility of using a Cursor on Target formatted output for 
the CBRN plug-in for the purposes of allowing non-Android-based TAK 
devices to view the sensor data generated and collected by the plug-in.  
• Finally, test the intercompatibility of SITAWARE and ATAK in order to 
determine if the SITAWARE system provides more stable network 
connectivity as claimed by Systematic Inc.  
We recommend that these research focus areas be explored in coordination with the 
Special Operations Program Executive Offices in the future. 
Additionally, the research team conducted experimentation with the ATAK and the 
Polish Special Forces in September 2018. Although not be captured in this capstone 
project, this experiment marks the beginning of testing with a SOF partner and broadens 
the problem set to include the European theater of operations. Recognizing nuclear and 
existential threats exist outside of the Korean theater of operations the opportunity and need 
to work more closely with SOCEUR, and our NATO SOF partners will continue to grow. 
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V. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Our research and experimentation identified the necessary CWMD sensor 
compatibility requirements and TAK plug-in software designs for meeting future JIIM 
mission sets. Additionally, we demonstrated that the JOCTAK, when properly 
implemented, will solve the identified gaps in CWMD C4I Operations. 
1. A near real-time common operational picture and improved situational 
awareness across all pertinent partners will facilitate JIIM operations.  
2. The capability to have an integrated C4I system with collective planning, 
mission command, and digital collaboration in near real-time between 
JIIM partners during all phases of CWMD operations. 
3. The capability to integrate sensors into the TAK network and allow an 
advanced RAA capability among operators, technical specialists, and 
mission command during a CWMD scenario. 
Although the U.S. Army is taking steps to fix its current C4I, a gap remains. The 
C4I capabilities provided by the Army’s adoption of Systematics’ SITAWARE as its 
primary mission command system and common operating picture tool will go a long way 
toward modernizing it. However, a need still exists regarding the support provided to the 
SOF warfighter from the operational level commands. JOC integration of the TAK system 
will fill that gap with a system that has proven itself at a tactical level.  
This adoption is not a panacea, however, even if the Army improves its C4I systems 
the gaps between U.S. SOF and JIIM partners will still exist with little or no improvement, 
leaving the same issues for JIIM collaboration unsolved. The adoption and integration of a 
TAK component to U.S. SOF and JIIM partners C4I systems will provide a commonality 
capable of bridging the gap that currently exists.  
JOCTAK’s significance is not simply that it is something new or innovative, 
although it is that, but also that it solves existing command-level capability gaps with 
reliable and known systems, whose further development enables tactical-level operations. 
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While this research provides a definite way forward for SOJTF CWMD operations, it has 
far-reaching implications in a multi-domain environment where data flow and information 
necessary for continuous operations continues to increase. 
As the development of the JOCTAK moves forward, we propose the following 
recommendations. First and foremost, it must maintain the flexibility that has made the 
ATAK system so successful and focus on enabling operations at the tactical level. It should 
not be tied to a specific hardware platform. Because of the Android platform’s inability to 
provide a robust JOC capability with the larger displays and greater processing power 
required, we suggest that it be based on WinTAK, WebTAK, or a combination of the two. 
Due to the developmental state of both of those programs, we suggest WinTAK, as it is 
more mature and already in use. Whichever option is chosen, it must have the capability to 
run in an austere location on a local machine while maintaining the capacity for outside 
SMEs to connect remotely and view relevant data or other information sent from the 
tactical units or the JOC. Also, it must maintain the ability to allow commanders to 
discriminate the data that individuals connected remotely have access to through network 
federation.  
Second, WinTAK lacks the capability for inter-compatibility with ATAK plug-ins 
across the entire TAK network. JOCTAK must have the ability to effectively see the data 
from ATAK plug-ins and interact with them. Possible methods to accomplish this include 
creating equivalent Windows-based plug-ins for WinTAK, using Cursor on Target 
message and file format to display the relevant information, using an emulator to allow the 
Android plug-in to function with WinTAK, or using a web browser-based solution. 
Pending the successful implementation of cross-platform compatibility for plug-ins and 
associated data, we believe the baseline capabilities of WinTAK with the current inventory 
of plug-ins already in operation will suffice for an initial or beta version of the JOCTAK. 
ATAK’s previously demonstrated rapid development cycle will prevent any operational 
shortages following the identification of a needed capability. The ever-growing ATAK 
plug-in library as a result of operational and training use in conjunction with regularly 
trained staff exercises will allow the development of JOC/AO specific capabilities. 
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Third, it has to be easy for developers to build plug-ins that are compatible across 
the spectrum of CBRN sensors. The JOCTAK not only has to be able to integrate with 
ATAK devices but also with the plethora of sensors and their accompanied software. 
Finally, but perhaps most importantly for a JIIM CWMD response, this system 
should be tested as robustly as possible with trusted JIIM partners for susceptibility to 
enemy counter-measures. This will determine the level and effectiveness of interoperability 
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Short Title Multi-Threaded Experiment (MTX) WAS Sensor/Fusion Testing - Camp Roberts, CA 
Phase Part A, Phase I (27 Feb 2018) 
Experiment 
Objectives  
Facilitate C-WMD SA across operational spectrum by exploring ways to 





Military forces do not have an aggregation tool to fuse data feeds from 
multiple rad/nuc operators and sensors and maintain shared SA during 
searches for nuclear materials of concern (NMOC).  
We define WAS for the purposes of this experiment as an urban area 
approximately the size and density of a mall, stadium, or city block, where 
multiple simultaneous detections from multiple sensors and operators are 




U.S. forces need to minimize the time required to DLI NMOC during WAS 
operations while maximizing force protection. Remote sensors mounted on 
UxVs can expedite search operations and reduce risks to friendly forces. 
Multiple feeds enhance RAA operator SA but challenge their coordination 
abilities. We need to improve ATAK R/N sensor integration to support SA, 
mission command and collaborative planning between operational elements 
during WAS operations. 
Research 
Questions 
What factors affect ATAK-WinTAK ingestion and display of multiple R/N 
sensor feeds during WAS? 
What factors affect HRM sensor data feed from and integration onto a mini 
UAV? 
What factors affect ARAM sensor data feed from and integration onto a 
UAV? 
What factors affect LIDAR sensor data feed from aboard Matrice UAV? 




Evaluate whether sensors operate and transmit properly when mounted on 
UxVs 
Evaluate ATAK R/N plug-in capability. 
Evaluate capability of mesh network to support UxV/sensor formation 
(using ATAK mesh network supported by TAK server).  
Evaluate feasibility of using a UxV formation assets to support D-L phases. 
Evaluate effects of predictive mapping of alert tracks. 
APPENDIX. EXPERIMENT WORKSHEETS 
JIFX I Camp Roberts, CA. FEB-MAR 2018 
 




Source material A vs B (Type/strength) 
Location of source material (in/around buildings) 
Reachback 
Model 
Reachback between forward-deployed R/N search team and RAA cell at 
HQ 
Constraints  
Weather conditions  
Intervening terrain 
UAV battery life 
Stand-off range requirements 
Criteria Ability of operator to use GUI Ability of RAA cell to coordinate various sensors 
  
Location MOUT Site, Camp Roberts, CA 
Date Tue, 27 Feb  
Players 
CENETIX research students (NPS) 
CENETIX Monitoring and Control team (NPS) 
95th Civil Support Team (CST) (CAARNG) 
RAP Team 7 (LLNL) 
Research Team (LBNL) 






CENETIX Testbed Portal  
TAK server 
Deployable MANET components 
Testbed MANET (NPS ATAK IP space) 
SA and data capture tools  
Sensor nodes 
 
Data will be collected and disseminated using NPS SA and data 
capture tools, WinTAK (for ATAK view), and Network 








Shield AI Quadrotor UAV 
Matrice 600 Hexarotor UAV 
 
Detectors and Sensors 
Sub-micron multi-beam / LIDAR sensor (LBNL) 
ARAM sensor (Terratracker) 
2x4x16” NAI gamma detector (DTRA/NPS) 
identiFINDER R-400 (NPS) 





ATAK R/N plug-in (NPS) 




U.S. military search teams are conducting WAS operations in urban terrain 
in a Pacific region partner nation to detect, locate, and identfy stolen 
NMOC. Their mission was initiated after intelligence tips led to the 
surveillance of some suspected Daesh terrorist sympathizers in the Santo 
Francese area. The suspects appear to have obtained and are attempting to 
sell some materials stolen from a nearby university medical hospital in 
October 2017. The sympathizers are still suspected to be in central 
Calitopia. 
 
In January 2018, the sympathizers were believed to be aboard a small craft 
during a routine safety stop by a Santo Francese maritime police boat 
outside of Santo Francese Bay when the SFPD ARAM sensor unexpectedly 
alerted. During secondary screening by the SFPD boat, the small craft in 
question exchanged gunfire, sped off, and was eventually lost in fog and 
local maritime large ship traffic.  
 
Despite continued vigilance by the SFPD maritime police, intelligence now 
indicates that the smugglers have moved inland and southward toward the 
Santa Josefine urban area. It remains unknown whether the NMOC have 
been sold or transferred to terrorists, but it is assessed that the material is 
still in the area as of early February 2018.  
 
With the help of remote U.S. DoE/LLNL Triage SMEs, the spectra readings 
from the SFPD boat were later analyzed and estimated to possibly match 
the signature of the missing university material. Authorities have requested 
all capable agencies to search for the NMOC, which is believed to be 
Cesium 137, but the readings were insufficiently long for an accurate 
estimate, and the sensor may have been too close to the suspect boat’s 
engine compartment, distorting the sensor readings. There is speculation 
that the suspects may be trying to mask (erroneously) using Thorium-treated 
welding rods and a thick casing material to hide the signature. 
 
Sketchy intelligence available from monitoring traffic on the dark web 
contains indirect chatter about attacking concentrations of civilians to cause 
“shocking” casualties, prompting a focus on large sporting events, concerts, 
and malls. This intelligence is being tentatively correlated to a lead from a 
local, previously reliable informant who is a recent Syrian refugee of 
Kurdish descent. The informant reports that in local tea shop circles, 
influential locals are increasingly critical of decadent Western women and 
frustrated over the social liberalization changes going on in Saudi Arabia. 
There are some female-oriented music concerts occurring in the near future 
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in the Santa Josefine area, which are of increased concern, and available 
teams are expected to be dispatched to several of them. 
 
Currently, a joint SOF team has been assigned the mission to search for the 
NMOC in a portion of a particular Santa Josefine warehouse area where a 
vigilant local business security guard has reported suspicious after-hours 
activities by individuals who are not known to belong to the neighboring 
companies. The SOF team has begun conducting radiological search 
employing low-visibility techniques to avoid drawing attention, but is now 
prepared to augment with small UxV systems due to the urgency of the 
situation based on the intelligence assessment. 
 
Scheme 
Phase I consists of the baseline scenario wherein multiple manned and unmanned sensors 
feed data individually to the TOC (at McMillan EOC) for fusion in the RAA portal. This 
precedes the later integration scenarios (Ph II, III). 
 
Steps:  
1. Crew assembles UxVs with sensors at MOUT site. 
2. Conduct safety checks and verify co-use and deconfliction. 
3. Conduct AM sequential individual sensor/UAV trials to detect and locate sources 
(based on battery duration of UAVs). 
4. Perform platform adjustments as required. 
5. Conduct PM sequential individual sensor/UAV trials to detect and locate sources 





Activity   NPS (PST) DC (+3) 
JIFX AM Brief (key personnel)   0800-0830 
1100-
1130  
Assemble kits for transport to MOUT site   0800-1000 
1100-
1300 
Move to MOUT site   1000-1030 
1300-
1330 
Set-up/Assembly at MOUT site   1030-1330 
1330-
1630 
Multi-sensor Trials   1330-1600 
1630-
1900 
Recover   1600-1615 
1900-
1915 
RTB   1615-1640 
1915-
1940 
CENETIX Hotwash at TOC   1600-1700 
1900-
2000  






   
RQ I-1 
What factors affect ATAK-WinTAK ingestion and display of multiple R/
N sensor feeds during WAS? 
MoPs Data Collector 
Multiple sensor data are monitorable for DLI of NMOC Search TM and 
Advise Cell 
Realtime / NRT upload / stream of multiple DLI data “ 
Identification of high and low ends of data transmission 
and receive rate “ 
Monitorability of data “ 
  
RQ I-2 
What factors affect HRM sensor data feed from, and integration onto, a 
mini UAV? 
MoPs Data Collector 
Breaks in N42 message flow Bourakov/Mejia 
Delays with N42 ingestion  “ 
Problems with N42 posting “ 
  
RQ I-3 
What factors affect ARAM sensor data feed from, and integration onto a 
UAV? 
MoPs Data Collector 
Breaks in N42 message flow Bourakov/Mejia 
Delays with N42 ingestion  “ 
Problems with N42 posting “ 
  
RQ I-4 
What factors affect LIDAR sensor data feed from aboard Matrice UAV? 
MoPs Data Collector 
Separate Document  Bourakov/Mejia 
“  “ 
“  “ 
  
RQ I-5 
What factors affect 2x4x16” NAI detector data feed from aboard Segway 
UGV? 
MoPs Data Collector 
Breaks in N42 message flow Bourakov/Mejia 
Delays with N42 ingestion  “ 





Logs System Latency  Bourakov 
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Appendix II (Part A, Phase II) to Annex C 
Data 
Collection  Tech 
Obsns 
Network S/W issues 
Network H/W issues 





Notepad Text chat thread Wendt 




















Short Title Multi-Threaded Experimentation (MTX) WAS Sensor/Fusion Testing - Camp Roberts, CA 
Phase Part A, Phase II (28 Feb 2018) 
Experiment 
Objectives  
Facilitate CWMD SA across operational spectrum by exploring ways to 




Military forces do not have an aggregation tool to fuse data feeds from 
multiple rad/nuc operators and sensors and maintain shared SA during 
searches for NMOC.  
We define WAS for the purposes of this experiment as an urban area 
approximately the size and density of a mall, stadium, or city block, 
where multiple simultaneous detections from multiple sensors and 
operators are possible and where each may require real-time adjudication 
by reachback SMEs. 
Tactical Level 
Problem 
U.S. forces need and minimize the time required to DLI NMOC during 
WAS operations while maximizing force protection. Remote sensors 
mounted on UxVs can expedite search operations and reduce risks to 
friendly forces. Multiple feeds enhance RAA operator SA, but challenge 
their coordination abilities. 
In order to improve ATAK, R/N sensor integration to support SA, 
mission command and collaborative planning between operational 
elements. During WAS operations the specific constraints regarding the 
UxV-based R/N sensor maneuvering as well as sensor/UxV data feed 
sequencing need to be identified. The major problem addressed by the 
Phase II experiment is to evaluate those constraints and to assess their 
effects on the DLI timeline. The second problem addressed by the Phase 
II experiment is how to improve ingestion, display, and feedback to 
multiple sensor operators by the Advise Cell and maximize efficiency in 




1. How does ATAK app R/N sensor data affect SA, mission command, 
and collective planning between elements during WAS operations? 
2. What factors affect ATAK-WinTAK ingestion and display of multiple 
R/N sensor feeds during WAS? 
3. What factors affect display of multiple R/N sensor feeds at Advise 
Cell/HQs? 
4. What are the maneuvering constraints and effects on the DLI timeline 
for HRM sensor onboard Shield AI? 
5. What are the maneuvering constraints and effects on the DLI timeline 
for ARAM sensors onboard UxVs? 
6. What are the maneuvering constraints and effects on the DLI timeline 
for a LIDAR sensor onboard a UxV? 
7. What are the maneuvering constraints and effects on the DLI timeline 
for ARAM sensors onboard UGVs? 
8. What are the maneuvering effects of identiFINDER sensor on the DLI 
timeline onboard UGVs? 




Evaluate ATAK R/N plug-in capability. 
Evaluate capability of mesh network to support UxV/sensor formation 
(using ATAK mesh network supported by TAK server).  
Evaluate feasibility of using a UxV formation assets to support DL 
phases: 
Evaluate effects of predictive mapping of alert tracks. 
Independent 
Variables 
Maneuvering (pattern/distance/ToT) ARAM Sensor onboard Matrice 
UAV 
Maneuvering HRM sensor onboard Shield AI UAV 
Maneuvering LIDAR sensor onboard Matrice UAV 
Maneuvering ARAM sensor onboard RMP 400 UGV 
Maneuvering LIDAR sensor onboard RMP 400 UGV 
Maneuvering LIDAR sensor onboard Talon UGV 
Maneuvering identiFINDERs operated by dismounted team 
Frequency of data feeds from ARAM, HRM, LIDAR, and 
IdentIFINDER sensors 
Enabling Sensor-ATAK-WinTAK data fusion display in the Advise Cell 
screen 
Enabling NPS Testbed and WinTAK fusion views integration 
Type/strength of source material (2 ea different sources) 
Location of source material (in/around buildings) 
Reachback 
Model 
1. Reachback between forward-deployed R/N search team and RAA cell 
at HQs 




Weather conditions  
Intervening terrain 
UAV battery life 
Stand-off range requirements 
Network bandwidth 
Sensor-advise Cell networking interrupts 
Advise cell-SME reachback interrupts  
Autonomous mode of Shield AI quadrotor 
Criteria Ability of operator to use GUI Ability of RAA cell to coordinate various sensors 
  
Location MOUT Site, Camp Roberts, CA 
Date Wed, 28 Feb  
Players 
CENETIX research students (NPS) 
CENETIX Monitoring and Control team (NPS) 
95th Civil Support Team (CST) (CAARNG) 
9th CST (CAARNG) 
RAP Team 7 (LLNL) 
Research Team (LBNL) 








CENETIX Testbed Portal  
TAK server 
Deployable MANET components 
Testbed MANET (NPS ATAK IP space) 
SA and data capture tools  
Sensor nodes 
 
Data will be collected and disseminated using NPS SA and data 
capture tools, WinTAK (for ATAK view), and Network Management 
Tools (Solar Winds, Wave Relay app, etc). 
 






Shield AI Quadrotor UAV 
Matrice 600 Hexarotor UAV 
 
Detectors and Sensors 
Sub-micron multi-beam/LIDAR sensor (LBNL) 
ARAM sensor (Terratracker) 
2x4x16” NaI detector (DTRA/NPS) 
2x4x16” NaI detector (NPS)  
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identiFINDER R-400 (NPS) 
HRM replacement mini sensors (DTRA) 
 
Software 
ATAK R/N plug-in (NPS) 
Wireless mesh network 
Sources/NORM (LLNL) 
Scenario 
U.S. military search teams are conducting WAS operations in urban 
terrain in a Pacific region partner nation to detect, locate, and identify 
stolen NMOC. Their mission was initiated after intelligence tips led to 
the surveillance of some suspected Daesh terrorist sympathizers in the 
Santo Francese area. The suspects appear to have obtained and are 
attempting to sell some materials stolen from a nearby university medical 
hospital in October 2017. The sympathizers are still suspected to be in 
central Calitopia. 
 
In January 2018, the sympathizers were believed to be aboard a small 
craft during a routine safety stop by a Santo Francese PD maritime police 
boat outside of Santo Francese bay when the SFPD ARAM sensor 
unexpectedly alerted. During secondary screening by the SFPD boat, the 
small craft in question exchanged gunfire, sped off, and was eventually 
lost in fog and local maritime large ship traffic. 
 
Despite continued vigilance by the SFPD maritime police, intelligence 
now points that the smugglers have moved inland and southward toward 
the Santa Josefine urban area. It remains unknown whether the NMOC 
have been sold or transferred to terrorists, but it is assessed that the 
material is still in the area as of early February 2018.  
 
With the help of remote U.S. DoE/LLNL Triage SMEs, the spectra 
readings from the SFPD boat were later analyzed and estimated to 
possibly match the signature of the missing university material. 
Authorities have requested all capable agencies to search for the NMOC, 
which is believed to be Cesium 137, but the readings were insufficiently 
long for an accurate estimate, and the sensor may have been too close to 
the suspect boat’s engine compartment, distorting the sensor readings. 
There is speculation that the suspects may be trying to mask 
(erroneously) using Thorium-treated welding rods and a thick casing 
material to hide the signature. 
 
Sketchy intelligence available from monitoring traffic on the dark web is 
indirect chatter about attacking concentrations of civilians to cause 
“shocking” casualties, prompting a focus on large sporting events, 
concerts, and malls. This intelligence is being tentatively correlated to a 
lead from a local, previously reliable informant who is a recent Syrian 
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refugee of Kurdish descent. The informant reports that in local tea shop 
circles, influential locals are increasingly critical of decadent Western 
women and frustrated over the social liberalization changes going on in 
Saudi Arabia. There are some female-oriented music concerts occurring 
in the near future in the Santa Josefine area, which are of increased 
concern, and available teams are expected to be dispatched to several of 
them. 
 
Currently, a joint SOF team has been assigned the mission to search for 
the NMOC in a portion of a particular Santa Josefine warehouse area 
where a vigilant local business security guard has reported suspicious 
after-hours activities by individuals who are not known to belong to the 
neighboring companies. The SOF team has begun conducting 
radiological search employing low visibility techniques to avoid drawing 
attention, but is now prepared to augment with small UxV systems due 
to the urgency of the situation based on the intelligence assessment. 
 
Triage Cell at LLNL has been alerted and is prepared to provide 




Phase II consists of the more integrated scenario wherein multiple manned and 
unmanned sensors feed data simultaneously via MANET to the TOC (at McMillan 
EOC) for fusion in the RAA portal. Search team and RAA cell will rehearse procedures 
to conduct reachback with LLNL Triage SMEs for integrated scenario in Phase III. 
 
Steps:  
1. Crew assembles UxVs with sensors at MOUT site. 
2. Conduct safety checks and verify co-use and deconfliction. 
3. Conduct AM combined/simultaneous sensor/UAV trials to detect and locate 
sources (based on battery duration of UAVs). 
4. Perform platform adjustments as required. 
5. Conduct PM combined/simultaneous sensor/UAV trials to detect and locate 




Activity   NPS (PST) DC (+3) 
JIFX AM Brief (selected personnel)   0800-0830 1100-1130  
CENETIX AM huddle (all)   0830-0915 1130-1215 
Assemble kits for transport to MOUT site   0915-0945 1215-1245 
Move to MOUT site   0945-1015 1245-1315 
Set-up/Assembly at MOUT site   1015-1100 1315-1400 
Multi-sensor Trial #1    1100-1230 1400-1530 
Food and Water Break Reset/Adjust as Required   1230-1300 1530-1600 
Multi-sensor Trial #2    1300-1600 1600-1900 
Recover   1600-1630 1900-1930 
RTB   1600-1630 1900-1930 
CENETIX Hotwash at Airfield   1630-1700 1930-2000  
JIFX PM Debrief (all personnel)   1700-1730 2000-2030 
 
RQ II-1 
How does ATAK R/N sensor integration affect SA, mission command, 
and collective planning between elements during WAS operations? 
MoPs Data Collector 





Continuous communication link between search elements/
Advise Cell “ 
Improved C2 visibility of search team actions for Advise Cell “ 
  
RQ II-2 What factors affect ATAK / WinTAK ingestion and display of multiple R/N sensor feeds? 
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MoPs Data Collector 





Real-time / NRT upload / stream of multiple DLI data “ 
Identification of high and low ends of data transmission and 
receive rate capability “ 
Identification of high priority data feeds “ 
  
RQ II-3 
What factors affect display of multiple R/N sensor feeds at Advise Cell/
HQs? 
MoPs Data Collector 





Real-time / NRT upload / stream of multiple DLI data “ 
Identification of high and low ends of data transmission and 
receive rate capability “ 
Monitorability of respective elements “ 
  
RQ II-4 
What are the maneuvering constraints and effects on the DLI timeline for 
HRM sensor onboard Shield AI?  
MoPs Data Collector 
Most informative maneuver pattern for DLI Sensor Operator 
Most informative stand-off distance threshold to source for DLI “ 
Preferred Ground Station (operator)-Sensor distance “ 
Sensor acquisition time threshold “ 
  
RQ II-5 
What are the maneuvering constraints and effects on the DLI timeline for 
ARAM sensors onboard Matrice UxVs?  
MoPs Data Collector 
Most informative maneuver pattern for DLI Sensor Operator 
Most informative stand-off distance threshold to source for DLI “ 
Preferred Ground Station (operator)-Sensor distance “ 
Sensor acquisition time threshold “ 
  
RQ II-6 
What are the maneuvering constraints and effects on the DLI timeline for 
a LIDAR sensor onboard a Matrice UxV?  
MoPs Data Collector 
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Most informative maneuver pattern for DLI Sensor Operator 
Most informative stand-off distance threshold to source for DLI “ 
Preferred Ground Station (operator)-Sensor distance “ 
Sensor acquisition time threshold “ 
  
RQ II-7 
What are the maneuvering constraints and effects on the DLI timeline for 
ARAM sensors onboard UGVs?  
MoPs Data Collector 
Most informative maneuver pattern for DLI Sensor Operator 
Most informative stand-off distance threshold to source for DLI “ 
Preferred Ground Station (operator)-Sensor distance “ 




Appendix III (Part A, Phase III) to Annex C 
RQ II-8 
What are the maneuvering effects of an identiFINDER sensor operated 
by a dismounted unit on the DLI timeline? 
MoPs Data Collector 
Most informative maneuver pattern for DLI Sensor Operator 
Most informative stand-off distance threshold to source for 
DLI “ 
Preferred Ground Station (operator)-Sensor distance. “ 
Sensor acquisition time threshold “ 
  
RQ II-8 
What are priority data feeds to display to support Advise Cell/HQs DM 
process)? 
MoPs Data Collector 
Most informative maneuver pattern for DLI Sensor Operator 
Most informative stand-off distance threshold to source for 
DLI “ 
Preferred Ground Station (operator)-Sensor distance “ 
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Short Title Multi-Threaded Experimentation (MTX) WAS Sensor/Fusion Testing - Camp Roberts, CA 
Phase Part A, Phase III (1 March 2018) 
Experiment 
Objectives  
Facilitate CWMD SA across operational spectrum by exploring ways to 





Military forces do not have an aggregation tool to fuse data feeds from 
multiple rad/nuc operators and sensors and maintain shared SA during 
searches for nuclear materials of concern (NMOC).  
We define WAS for the purposes of this experiment as an urban area 
approximately the size and density of a mall, stadium, or city block, 
where multiple simultaneous detections from multiple sensors and 
operators are possible and where each may require real-time 
adjudication by reachback SMEs. 
Tactical Level 
Problem 
U.S. forces need and minimize the time required to Detect, Locate, and 
Identify NMOC during WAS operations while maximizing force 
protection. Remote sensors mounted on UxVs can expedite search 
operations and reduce risks to friendly forces. Multiple feeds enhance 
RAA operator SA but challenge their coordination abilities. 
Correspondingly, the main tactical problem that Phase III addresses is 
to identify the best combinations of R/N sensor-UxV platform 
maneuvering and sequencing during the DLI cycle coordinated Advise 
Cell (RAA operator) for minimizing time and maximizing adjudication 
speed required for WAS completion.  
Research 
Questions 
1. How can ATAK R/N sensor improve SA, mission command, and 
collective planning between elements during WAS operations? 
2. What factors affect ATAK / WinTAK ingestion and display of 
multiple R/N sensor feeds? 
3. What factors affect ability of operators to conduct synchronous 
reachback between sensor operators and Triage SMEs during the 
Identify phase? 
4. What is optimal sequencing effect to minimize the DLI timeline for 
an HRM sensor onboard a Shield AI, subject to ARAM-Matrice, 
ARAM-UGV, LIDAR-Matrice, LIDAR-UGV, RadMet unattended, 
dismounted identiFINDER feed augmentation? 
5. What is optimal sequencing to minimize DLI timeline for ARAM-
Matrice sensor usage, subject to HRM-Shield AI, ARAM-UGV, 
LIDAR-Matrice, LIDAR-UGV, RadMet unattended, dismounted 
identiFINDER feed augmentation ? 
6. What is optimal sequencing to minimize DLI timeline for LIDAR-
Matrice sensor usage, subject to HRM-Shield AI, ARAM-UGV, 
LIDAR-UGV, RadMet unattended, identiFINDERs dismounted feeds 
augmentation? 
7. What is optimal sequencing on minimize DLI timeline for ARAM-
UGV sensor usage, subject to HRM-Shield AI, ARAM-Matrice, 
LIDAR-Matrice, LIDAR-UGV, RadMet unattended, identiFINDERs 
dismounted feeds augmentation? 
8. What is optimal sequencing to minimize DLI timeline for LIDAR-
UGV sensor usage, subject to HRM-Shield AI, ARAM-UGV, LIDAR-




9. What is optimal sequencing to minimize DLI timeline for RadMet-
Unattended sensor usage, subject to HRM-Shield AI, ARAM-UGV, 
LIDAR-Matrice, LIDAR-UGV, RadMet unattended, identiFINDERs 
dismounted feeds augmentation? 
10. What is optimal sequencing to minimize DLI timeline for 
identiFINDERs dismounted feeds sensor usage, subject to HRM-Shield 




Evaluate ATAK R/N plug-in capability. 
Evaluate capability of mesh network to support UxV/sensor formation 
(using ATAK mesh network supported by TAK server).  
Evaluate effects of predictive mapping of alert tracks. 
Independent 
Variables 
Sequencing ARAM sensor onboard Matrice UAV 
Sequencing HRM sensor onboard Shield AI UAV 
Sequencing LIDAR sensor onboard Matrice UAV 
Sequencing ARAM sensor onboard RMP 400 UGV 
Sequencing LIDAR sensor onboard RMP 400 UGV 
Sequencing LIDAR sensor onboard Talon UGV 
Sequencing identiFINDERs operated by dismounted 
Sequencing RedMet Unattended sensors 
Frequency of data feeds from ARAM, HRM, LIDAR, and identiFINDER 
sensors 
Enabling sensor-ATAK-WinTAK data fusion display in the Advise Cell 
screen 
Enabling NPS Testbed and WinTAK fusion views integration 
Type/strength of source material (2 ea different sources) 
Location of source material (in/around buildings) 
Reachback 
Model 
1. Reachback between forward deployed R/N search team and RAA 
Cell at HQs 
2. Reachback between RAA Cell at HQs and Triage SMEs 
Environmental 
Constraints  
Weather conditions  
Intervening terrain 
UAV battery life 
Stand-off range requirements 
Network bandwidth 
Sensor-Advise Cell networking interrupts 
Advise Cell-SME reachback interrupts 
Criteria Ability of operator to use GUI Ability of RAA cell to coordinate various sensors 
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Location MOUT Site, Camp Roberts, CA 
Date Thu, 1 Mar  
Players 
CENETIX research students (NPS) 
CENETIX Monitoring and Control team (NPS) 
95th Civil Support Team (CST) (CAARNG) 
9th CST, CAARNG 
RAP Team 7 (LLNL) 
Research Team (LBNL) 






CENETIX Testbed Portal  
TAK server 
Deployable MANET components 
Testbed MANET (NPS ATAK IP space) 
SA and data capture tools  
Sensor nodes 
 
Data will be collected and disseminated using NPS SA and data 
capture tools, WinTAK (for ATAK view), and Network 
Management Tools (Solar Winds, Wave Relay app, etc). 
 




Segway UGV (NPS) 
Talon UGV (95th CST) 
Shield AI Quadrotor UAV (NSW) 
Matrice 600 Hexarotor UAV (NPS) 
Detectors and Sensors 
Sub-micron multi-beam / LIDAR sensor (LBNL) 
ARAM sensor (Terratracker) 
2x4x16” NaI gamma detector (DTRA/NPS) 
2x4x16” NaI detector (NPS) 
identiFINDER R-400 (NPS) 
HRM replacement mini sensors (DTRA) 
Software 
ATAK R/N plug-in (NPS) 





U.S. military search teams are conducting WAS operations in urban 
terrain in a Pacific region partner nation to detect, locate, and identify 
NMOC. Their mission was initiated after intelligence tips led to the 
surveillance of some suspected Daesh terrorist sympathizers in the Santo 
Francese area. The suspects appear to have obtained and are attempting 
to sell some materials stolen from a nearby university medical hospital in 
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October 2017. The sympathizers are still suspected to be in central 
Calitopia. 
In January 2018, the sympathizers were believed to be aboard a small 
craft during a routine safety stop by a Santo Francese PD maritime police 
boat outside of Santo Francese bay when the SFPD ARAM sensor 
unexpectedly alerted. During secondary screening by the SFPD boat, the 
small craft in question exchanged gunfire, sped off, and was eventually 
lost in fog and local maritime large ship traffic.  
 
Despite continued vigilance by the SFPD maritime police, intelligence 
now points that the smugglers have moved inland and southward toward 
the Santa Josefine urban area. It remains unknown whether the NMOC 
have been sold or transferred to terrorists, but it is assessed that the 
material is still in the area as of early February 2018.  
 
With the help of remote U.S. DoE/LLNL Triage SMEs, the spectra 
readings from the SFPD boat were later analyzed and estimated to 
possibly match the signature of the missing university material. 
Authorities have requested all capable agencies to search for the NMOC, 
which is believed to be Cesium 137, but the readings were insufficiently 
long for an accurate estimate, and the sensor may have been too close to 
the suspect boat’s engine compartment, distorting the sensor readings. 
There is speculation that the suspects may be trying to mask 
(erroneously) using Thorium-treated welding rods and a thick casing 
material to hide the signature. 
 
Sketchy intelligence available from monitoring traffic on the dark web is 
indirect chatter about attacking concentrations of civilians to cause 
“shocking” casualties, prompting a focus on large sporting events, 
concerts, and malls. This intelligence is being tentatively correlated to a 
lead from a local, previously reliable informant who is a recent Syrian 
refugee of Kurdish descent. The informant reports that in local tea shop 
circles, influential locals are increasingly critical of decadent Western 
women and frustrated over the social liberalization changes going on in 
Saudi Arabia. There are some female-oriented music concerts occurring 
in the near future in the Santa Josefine area, which are of increased 
concern, and available teams are expected to be dispatched to several of 
them. 
 
Currently, a joint SOF team has been assigned the mission to search for 
the NMOC in a portion of a particular Santa Josefine warehouse area 
where a vigilant local business security guard has reported suspicious 
after-hours activities by individuals who are not known to belong to the 
neighboring companies. The SOF team has begun conducting 
radiological search employing low-visibility techniques to avoid drawing 
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attention, but is now prepared to augment with small UxV systems due 
to the urgency of the situation based on the intelligence assessment. 
 
Upon detection and location of suspected NMOC, the search team 
coordinates via the RAA Cell at HQs directly with the LLNL Triage 
SMEs to identify the materials. 
 
Scheme 
Phase III consists of the fully integrated scenario wherein multiple manned and 
unmanned sensors feed data simultaneously via MANET to the TOC (at McMillan 
EOC) for fusion in the RAA portal. This phase incorporates all aspects of Detect-
Locate-Identify, including reachback to Triage SMEs for adjudication. 
 
Steps:  
1. Crew assembles UxVs with sensors at MOUT site. 
2. Conduct safety checks and verify co-use and deconfliction. 
3. Conduct AM combined/simultaneous sensor/UAV trials to detect and locate 
sources (based on battery duration of UAVs). 
4. Perform platform adjustments as required. 
5. Conduct PM combined/simultaneous sensor/UAV trials to detect and locate 




Activity   NPS (PST) DC (+3) 
AM JIFX Brief (selected personnel)   0800-0830 1100-1130  
Assemble kits for transport to MOUT site   0800-0830 1100-1130 
Move to MOUT site   0830-0900 1130-1200 
Set-up/Assembly at MOUT site   0900-0930 1200-1230 
Multi-sensor Trial #1    0930-1030 1230-1330 




Battery Recharge/Break   1130-1230 1430-1530 
Reset/Adjust as Required   1230-1330 1530-1630 
Multi-sensor Trial #3    1330-1430 1630-1730 
Multi-sensor Trial #4   1430-1530 1730-1830 
Recover   1530-1600 1830-1900 
RTB   1600-1630 1900-1930 
CENETIX Hotwash at Airfield TOC   1600-1630 1900-1930  





How can ATAK R/N sensor improve SA, mission command and 
collective planning between elements during WAS operations? 
MoPs Data Collector 
Persistent common operational picture and S/A shared 




Continuous communication link between search elements, 
Advise Cell, and HQ “ 
Improved C2 capability of search team leader, Advise Cell, 




What factors affect ATAK / WinTAK ingestion and display of multiple 
R/N sensor feeds? 
MoPs Data Collector 





Realtime / NRT upload / stream of multiple DLI data  “ 
Identification of high and low ends of data transmission and 
receive rate capability “ 
Monitorability of respective elements “ 
  
RQ III-3 
What factors affect ability of operators to conduct synchronous 
reachback between sensor operators and Triage SMEs during the Identify 
phase?  
MoPs Data Collector 
Number of additional screening requests from SMEs Advise Cell 
Delays of SME responses to sensor feeds and Advise Cell 
requests “ 




What is optimal sequencing effect to minimize the DLI timeline for an 
HRM sensor onboard a Shield AI, subject to ARAM-Matrice, ARAM-
UGV, LIDAR-Matrice, LIDAR-UGV, RadMet unattended, dismounted 
identiFINDER feed augmentation?  
MoPs Data Collector 
Simultaneous or sequential order during Detect Phase Advise Cell 
Duration of acquisition time during Detect Phase “ 
Simultaneous or sequential order during Locate Phase “ 
Duration of acquisition time during Locate Phase “ 
Simultaneous or sequential order during Locate Phase “ 
Duration of acquisition time during Identify Phase “ 
  
RQ III-5 
What is optimal sequencing to minimize DLI timeline for ARAM-
Matrice sensor usage, subject to HRM-Shield AI, ARAM-UGV, LIDAR-
Matrice, LIDAR-UGV, RadMet unattended, identiFINDERs dismounted 
feeds augmentation? 
MoPs Data Collector 
Simultaneous or sequential order during Detect Phase Advise Cell 
Duration of acquisition time during Detect Phase “ 
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Simultaneous or sequential order during Locate Phase “ 
Duration of acquisition time during Locate Phase “ 
Simultaneous or sequential order during Locate Phase “ 
Duration of acquisition time during Identify Phase “ 
  
RQ III-6 
What is optimal sequencing to minimize DLI timeline for LIDAR-
Matrice sensor usage, subject to HRM-Shield AI, ARAM-UGV, LIDAR-
UGV, RadMet unattended, IdentiFinders dismounted feeds 
augmentation?  
MoPs Data Collector 
Simultaneous or sequential order during Detect Phase Advise Cell 
Duration of acquisition time during Detect Phase “ 
Simultaneous or sequential order during Locate Phase “ 
Duration of acquisition time during Locate Phase “ 
Simultaneous or sequential order during Locate Phase “ 
Duration of acquisition time during Identify Phase “ 
  
RQ III-7 
What is optimal sequencing on minimize DLI timeline for ARAM-UGV 
sensor usage, subject to HRM-Shield AI, ARAM-Matrice, LIDAR-
Matrice, LIDAR-UGV, RadMet unattended, identiFINDERs dismounted 
feeds augmentation? 
MoPs Data Collector 
Simultaneous or sequential order during Detect Phase Advise Cell 
Duration of acquisition time during Detect Phase “ 
Simultaneous or sequential order during Locate Phase “ 
Duration of acquisition time during Locate Phase “ 
Simultaneous or sequential order during Locate Phase “ 
Duration of acquisition time during Identify Phase “ 
  
RQ III-8 
What is optimal sequencing to minimize DLI timeline for LIDAR-UGV 
sensor usage, subject to HRM-Shield AI, ARAM-UGV, LIDAR-
Matrice, RadMet unattended, identiFINDERs dismounted feeds 
augmentation? 
MoPs Data Collector 
Simultaneous or sequential order during Detect Phase Advise Cell 
Duration of acquisition time during Detect Phase “ 
Simultaneous or sequential order during Locate Phase “ 
Duration of acquisition time during Locate Phase “ 
Simultaneous or sequential order during Locate Phase “ 





What is optimal sequencing to minimize DLI timeline for RadMet-
Unattended sensor usage, subject to HRM-Shield AI, ARAM-UGV, 
LIDAR-Matrice, LIDAR-UGV, RadMet unattended, identiFINDERs 
dismounted feeds augmentation?  
MoPs Data Collector 
Simultaneous or sequential order during Detect Phase Advise Cell 
Duration of acquisition time during Detect Phase “ 
Simultaneous or sequential order during Locate Phase “ 
Duration of acquisition time during Locate Phase “ 
Simultaneous or sequential order during Locate Phase “ 
Duration of acquisition time during Identify Phase “ 
  
RQ III-10 
What is optimal sequencing to minimize DLI timeline for 
identiFINDERs dismounted feeds sensor usage, subject to HRM-Shield 
AI, ARAM-UGV, LIDAR-Matrice, LIDAR-UGV, RedMet unattended, 
RadMet-Unattended? 
MoPs Data Collector 
Simultaneous or sequential order during Detect Phase Advise Cell 
Duration of acquisition time during Detect Phase “ 
Simultaneous or sequential order during Locate Phase “ 
Duration of acquisition time during Locate Phase “ 
Simultaneous or sequential order during Locate Phase “ 
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JIFX II Camp Roberts, CA. AUG 2018 
 
Appendix I (Live-Ex Part A, Test I) to Annex C 
Short Title RAA Implement TAK as an Operational Level C4I Tool  
Phase Part A, Test I; Single Node / Single Sensor 
Experiment 
Objective  
This experiment will advance previous testing of CBRN sensor 
integration into the TAK infrastructure. The objective of this experiment 
is to evaluate the effectiveness of specialized CWMD sensors and TAK 
plug-ins and how they improve RAA capability between operators, 





Operational level (JTF) mission command systems currently do not have 
an aggregation tool that combines data feeds from multiple tactical 
elements and sensors in a single system to maintain C2 and shared SA 
during operations, specifically in a CWMD scenario. As U.S. and partner 
nation forces conduct CWMD operations, they must have the capability 
to rapidly share information and alerts between tactical unit members and 
a higher headquarters. 
Tactical Level 
Problem 
Tactical elements need ATAK R/N and other sensor integration to support 
SA, mission command, task coordination, and collaborative planning 
between tactical elements during CWMD operations. 
Tactical elements need an external handheld information-sharing tool to 
synchronously collaborate with remote CBRN subject matter experts. 
Tactical elements need an internal handheld information sharing tool to 
self-organize and RAA to a changing CWMD situation. 
Research 
Questions 
1. Can the JOC RAA Cell and tactical units exchange sensor data in near 
real time?  
2. What factors affect the TAK infrastructure operating as a C4I tool and 
integrating sensors in a CWMD scenario? 
3. What factors affect the JOC-to-sensor remote management capability 
using the CBRN plug-in and a connected sensor? 
Technical 
Tasks 
Pair associated sensor(s) with ATAK phone(s) 
Establish TAK infrastructure 
Establish a network (MANET, WIFI, Cellular) 




Distance between sensor and ATAK device 
Network type/distance—WIFI, MANET, Cellular 
Size/Content of R/N data exchanged 
Reachback 
Model 
Tactical element to RAA Cell at JOC; JOC to remote R/N SME. May 
include direct comms or RAA Cell may mediate interaction. JOC may 




Network signal strength  
Capacity of the network 
Weather conditions 
Limited WinTAK compatibility 




Ability of JOC and operators to exchange data through TAK 
TAK data throughput 
  
Location Camp Roberts, CA 
Date Mon-Thu, 6–9 Aug 2018  
Players CENETIX research students (NPS) CENETIX Monitoring and Control team (NPS) 
Testbed 
Infrastructure 
CENETIX Testbed Portal  
TAK server 
Deployable MANET components 
Testbed MANET (NPS ATAK IP space) 
SA and data capture tools  
Sensor nodes 
 
Data will be collected and disseminated using NPS SA and data capture 
tools, WinTAK (for ATAK view), and Network Management Tools (Solar 









ATAK R/N plug-in 






Phase I consists of single manned sensors connected to individual nodes and the JOC 
RAA Cell for fusion and C2 functions. Search team and RAA Cell will rehearse 
procedures to conduct reach-back and provide assistance / updates.  
 
Steps:  
1. Assemble sensors at MOUT site. 
2. Establish ATAK connectivity with single sensor and confirm connectivity with 
JOC. 
3. Conduct safety checks and verify co-use and deconfliction. 
4. Conduct AM sensor trials to Detect, Locate, and identify R/N source. 
5. Perform platform and network adjustments as required. 




Activity   NPS (PST) 
AM Brief   0800-0830 
Setup   0830-0900 
Field Test 1/ Phase I   0900-1200 
100 
Break    1200-1300 
Field Test 2 / Phase II   1300-1600 
Recover   1600-1630 
RTB   1630-1700 
AAR at TOC   1700-1730 
 
   
RQ I-1 
Can the JOC and tactical units send and receive sensor data in near real 
time? 
MoPs Data Collector 




Measured latency of data feed and its effect on operations “ 
Quality of data flow “ 
  
RQ I-2 
What issues prohibit the current TAK infrastructure from operating as a 
C4I tool and integrating sensors in a CWMD scenario? 
MoPs Data Collector 
Functionality of CBRN plug-in on Android ATAK platform Tactical Unit 
/ JOC 
Functionality of CBRN plug-in on Windows WinTAK 
platform 
“ 




What is the JOC to sensor remote management capability with the CBRN 
plug-in and connected sensor? 
MoPs Data Collector 




JOCs ability to simultaneously manipulate multiple sensor 
settings remotely Phase I? 
“ 
JOCs able to receive multiple sensor data feeds “ 











Network S/W issues 
Network H/W issues 
Sensor Equipment issues  
 
Obsr 
Notepad Text chat thread  
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Appendix II (Live-Ex Part A, Test II) to Annex C 










Short Title RAA Implement TAK as an Operational Level C4I Tool  
Phase Part A, Test II; Single Node / Multi Sensor 
Experiment 
Objectives  
This experiment will advance previous testing of CBRN sensor integration 
into the TAK infrastructure. The objective of this experiment is to evaluate 
the effectiveness of specialized CWMD sensors, and TAK plug-ins and how 
they improve remote advise and assist (RAA) capability between operators, 





Operational level (JTF) Mission Command systems currently do not have 
an aggregation tool that combines data feeds from multiple tactical elements 
and sensors in a single system to maintain C2 and shared SA during 
operations, specifically in a CWMD scenario. As U.S. and partner nation 
forces conduct CWMD operations, they must have the capability to rapidly 




Tactical elements need ATAK R/N and other sensor integration to support 
SA, mission command, task coordination and collaborative planning 
between tactical elements during CWMD operations. 
Tactical elements need an external handheld information-sharing tool to 
synchronously collaborate with remote CBRN subject matter experts. 
Tactical elements need an internal handheld information sharing tool to self-
organize and RAA to a changing CWMD situation. 
Research 
Questions 
1. Can the JOC RAA Cell and tactical units exchange sensor data in near 
real time?  
2. What factors affect the TAK infrastructure operating as a C4I tool and 
integrating sensors in a CWMD scenario? 
3. What factors affect the JOC-to-sensor remote management capability 
using the CBRN plug-in and a connected sensor? 
4. What is the JOC to sensor remote management capability with the CBRN 
plug-in and connected sensor? 
Technical 
Tasks 
Pair associated sensor(s) with ATAK phone(s) 
Establish TAK infrastructure 
Establish a network (MANET, WIFI, Cellular) 





Distance between sensor and ATAK device 
Network type/distance (WIFI, MANET, Cellular) 
Size/Content of R/N data exchanged 
Reachback 
Model 
Tactical element to RAA Cell at JOC; JOC to remote R/N SME. May 
include direct comms or RAA Cell may mediate interaction. JOC may need 
to simulate remote SME distance. 
Functional 
Constraints  
Network signal strength  
Capacity of the network 
Weather conditions 
Limited WinTAK compatibility 




Ability of JOC and operators to exchange data through TAK 
TAK data throughput 
Location Camp Roberts, CA 
Date Mon-Thur, 6–9 Aug 2018  
Players CENETIX research students (NPS) CENETIX Monitoring and Control team (NPS) 
Testbed 
Infrastructure 
CENETIX Testbed Portal  
TAK server 
Deployable MANET components 
Testbed MANET (NPS ATAK IP space) 
SA and data capture tools  
Sensor nodes 
 
Data will be collected and disseminated using NPS SA and data capture 
tools, WinTAK (for ATAK view), and Network Management Tools (Solar 









ATAK R/N plug-in 






Phase I consists of single manned sensors connected to individual nodes and the JOC 
RAA Cell for fusion and C2 functions. Search team and RAA Cell will rehearse 
procedures to conduct reach-back and provide assistance / updates.  
 
Steps:  
1. Assemble sensors at MOUT site. 
2. Establish ATAK connectivity with single sensor and confirm connectivity with 
JOC. 
3. Conduct safety checks and verify co-use and deconfliction. 
4. Conduct AM sensor trials to Detect, Locate, and identify R/N source. 
5. Perform platform and network adjustments as required. 
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Activity   NPS (PST) 
AM Brief   0800-0830 
Setup   0830-0900 
Field Test 1/ Phase I   0900-1200 
Break    1200-1300 
Field Test 2 / Phase II   1300-1600 
Recover   1600-1630 
RTB   1630-1700 
AAR at TOC   1700-1730 
 
RQ I-1 
Can the JOC and tactical units send and receive sensor data in near real 
time? 
MoPs Data Collector 
JOC/Tactical unit able to transmit and receive CBRN data feed Tactical Unit 
/ JOC 
Measured latency of data feed and its effect on operations “ 
Quality of data flow “ 
  
RQ I-2 
Can the TAK infrastructure support multiple sensor feeds? 
MoPs Data Collector 
Tactical unit able to operate and view multiple sensor feeds Tactical Unit 
/ JOC 
Realtime / NRT upload / stream of multiple data feeds “ 
Measured latency of data feeds “ 
  
RQ I-3 
What issues prohibit the current TAK infrastructure from operating as a 
C4I tool and integrating sensors in a CWMD scenario? 
MoPs Data Collector 
Functionality of CBRN plug-in on Android ATAK platform Tactical Unit 
/ JOC 
Functionality of CBRN plug-in on Windows WinTAK 
platform 
“ 





Appendix III (Live-Ex Part A, Test III) to Annex C 
RQ I-4 
What is the JOC to sensor remote management capability with the CBRN 
plug-in and connected sensor? 
MoPs Data Collector 




JOCs ability to simultaneously manipulate multiple sensor 
settings remotely 
“ 
JOCs able to receive multiple sensor data feeds “ 




Network S/W issues 
Network H/W issues 
Sensor equipment issues  
 
Obsr Notepad Text chat thread  










Short Title RAA Implement TAK as an Operational Level C4I Tool  
Phase Part A, Test III; Multi Node / Multi Sensor 
Experiment 
Objective  
This experiment will advance previous testing of CBRN sensor 
integration into the TAK infrastructure. The objective of this experiment 
is to evaluate the effectiveness of specialized CWMD sensors and TAK 
plug-ins and how they improve RAA capability between operators, 





Operational level (JTF) mission command systems currently do not have 
an aggregation tool that combines data feeds from multiple tactical 
elements and sensors in a single system to maintain C2 and shared SA 
during operations, specifically in a CWMD scenario. As U.S. and partner 
nation forces conduct CWMD operations, they must have the capability 
to rapidly share information and alerts between tactical unit members and 
a higher headquarters. 
Tactical Level 
Problem 
Tactical elements need ATAK R/N and other sensor integration to support 
SA, mission command, task coordination and collaborative planning 
between tactical elements during CWMD operations. 
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Tactical elements need an external handheld information-sharing tool to 
synchronously collaborate with remote CBRN subject matter experts. 
Tactical elements need an internal handheld information sharing tool to 
self-organize and RAA to a changing CWMD situation. 
Research 
Questions 
1. Can the JOC RAA Cell and tactical units exchange sensor data in near 
real time?  
2. What factors affect the TAK infrastructure operating as a C4I tool and 
integrating sensors in a CWMD scenario? 
3. What factors affect the JOC-to-sensor remote management capability 
using the CBRN plug-in and a connected sensor? 
4. What is the JOC to sensor remote management capability with the 
CBRN plug-in and connected sensor? 
Technical 
Tasks 
Pair associated sensor(s) with ATAK phone(s) 
Establish TAK infrastructure 
Establish a network (MANET, WIFI, Cellular) 




Distance between sensor and ATAK device 
Network type/distance—WIFI, MANET, Cellular 
Size/Content of R/N data exchanged 
Reachback 
Model 
Tactical element to RAA Cell at JOC; JOC to remote R/N SME. May 
include direct comms or RAA Cell may mediate interaction. JOC may 
need to simulate remote SME distance. 
Functional 
Constraints  
Network signal strength  
Capacity of the Network 
Weather conditions 
Limited WinTAK compatibility 




Ability of JOC and operators to exchange data through TAK 
TAK data throughput 
  
Location Camp Roberts, CA 
Date Mon-Thur, 6–9 Aug 2018  
Players CENETIX research students (NPS) CENETIX Monitoring and Control team (NPS) 
Testbed 
Infrastructure 
CENETIX Testbed Portal  
TAK server 
Deployable MANET components 
Testbed MANET (NPS ATAK IP space) 
SA and data capture tools  
Sensor nodes 
 




capture tools, WinTAK (for ATAK view), and Network Management 








ATAK R/N plug-in 






Phase I consists of single manned sensors connected to individual nodes and the JOC 
RAA Cell for fusion and C2 functions. Search team and RAA Cell will rehearse 
procedures to conduct reach-back and provide assistance / updates.  
 
Steps:  
1. Assemble sensors at MOUT site. 
2. Establish ATAK connectivity with single sensor and confirm connectivity with 
JOC. 
3. Conduct safety checks and verify co-use and deconfliction. 
4. Conduct AM sensor trials to detect, locate, and identify R/N source. 
5. Perform platform and network adjustments as required. 





Activity   NPS (PST) 
AM Brief   0800-0830 
Setup   0830-0900 
Field Test 3/ Phase III   0900-1200 
Break    1200-1300 
Field Test 4 / Phase III   1300-1600 
Recover   1600-1630 
RTB   1630-1700 
AAR at TOC   1700-1730 
 
   
RQ I-1 
Can the JOC and tactical units send and receive sensor data in near real 
time? 
MoPs Data Collector 




Measured latency of data feed and its effect on operations “ 




Can the TAK infrastructure support multiple sensor feeds? 
MoPs Data Collector 
Tactical unit able to operate and view multiple sensor feeds Tactical Unit 
/ JOC 
Realtime / NRT upload / stream of multiple data feeds “ 




What issues prohibit the current TAK infrastructure from operating as a 
C4I tool and integrating sensors in a CWMD scenario? 
MoPs Data Collector 
Functionality of CBRN plug-in on Android ATAK platform Tactical Unit 
/ JOC 
Functionality of CBRN plug-in on Windows WinTak platform “ 
Ability of TAK to process multiple sensor data feeds “ 
  
RQ I-4 
What is the JOC to sensor remote management capability with the CBRN 
plug-in and connected sensor? 







JOC’s ability to manipulate individual sensor settings remotely Tactical Unit 
/ JOC 
JOC’s ability to simultaneously manipulate multiple sensor 
settings remotely. 
“ 
JOC’s ability to receive multiple sensor data feeds “ 




Network S/W issues 
Network H/W issues 
Sensor equipment issues  
 
Obsr Notepad Text chat thread  
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